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CORPORATE LOANS TO DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS:
EVERY BUSINESS NOW A BANK?
JAYNE

W.

BARNARD*

In most states, a corporation may loan money to an officer or director if the
board of directors authorizes the loan and finds that it will "benefit" the corporation.
According to Professor Jayne W. Barnard, however, this benefit requirement has
proved to.be an illusory standard. Barnard reviews existing law on the subject and
surveys the·executive lending practices of 152 publicly held corporations. She concludes that executive loan enabling statutes have failed to consider the risks involved
in making such loans, such as illiquidity, inadequate collateralization, inclination to
default, and volatility of the economy. As a result, current laws permit the diversion
of corporate resources to nonproductive uses and encourage the overcompensation
of certain executives.

I.

INTRODUCTION

For many years, corporations were prohibited by law from making
loans to their officers and directors. An example appears in the original
Model Business Corporation Act (MBCA), 1 which provided simply
that "11-o loans shall be made by a corporation to its officers or directors,
and no loans shall be made by a corporation secured by its shares." 2
Even Delaware's Corporation Law prohibited loans to corporate managers. 3 These widely accepted prohibitions were designed "to protect
•
Associate Professor of Law, Marshall-Wythe School of Law, College of William &
Mary, Williamsburg, Virginia. I am grateful to many people for their assistance in the preparation
of this Article. Tim Clark of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. provided the proxy materials upon which
the executive loan empirical study is based. Larry Schimmels, a second-year law student at William
& Mary, and Theresa Schmid, our Reference Librarian, each provided research support. Kate
Marriott, Cha.rles Koch, Paul Lebel, Judith Ledbetter, and Ingrid Hillinger each contributed
insights distinctive to their fields, as did my husband, John Tucker. The research was funded, in
part, by a summer research grant from the College of William & Mary.
I. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT (1946).
2. /d. at§ 42. This language remained in effect until 1969. See infra note 39. As strict as
it was, this initial formulation was still criticized for not clearly prohibiting various subterfuges
with the practical effect of permitting extra-compensatory financial assistance to corporate managers. See Jennings, The Role of the States in Corporate Regulation and Investor Protection, 23 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 193, 199-200 (1958).
3. The Delaware General Corporation Law of 1915 provided: "No corporation created
under this Chapter shall make any loan of money to any officer of such corporation, nor shall any
loan be made to a stockholder upon the security of the stock of the corporation .... " 65 DEL. REv.
CODE§ 1950 (1915) quoted in Graham v. Young, 35 Del. 484, 485-86, 167 A. 906, 907 (1933).
Already by 1915 Delaware's corporation statute was "commonly regarded as a modern and 'liberal' act." Cary, Federalism and Corporate Law: Reflections Upon Delaware, 83 YALE L.J. 663,66465 (1974). The General Corporation Law later provided "No loans shall be made by a corporation
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the interests of creditors, to prevent impairment of corporate resources
and to prohibit use of corporate assets by management for private
purposes. " 4
Today, only four states maintain the statutory prohibition against
executive loans by domiciliary corporations. 5 With the competitive
"modernization" of corporate law by the states, these prohibitions
have elsewhere been replaced by a variety of enabling responses, which
are summarized in Appendix I of this Article.
Six states now permit executive loans where there has been express
shareholder approval. 6 Twenty-nine states expressly permit executive
loans where authorized by the board of directors. Most of these, including Delaware, merely require the board to find that making the loan will
to its officers or directors, and no loans shall be made by a corporation secured by its shares .... "
DEL CODE ANN. tit. 8 § 143 (1953), quoted in Maclary v. Pleasant Hills, Inc., 35 Del. Ch. 39, 47 n.2,
109 A.2d 830, 836 n.2 (1954).
·
·
4. I MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT ANN.§ 42, comment 4 (1960). See Wulfjen v. Dolton,
24 Cal. 2d 878, 888, !51 P.2d 840, 845 (Cal. 1944) (California statute prohibiting executive loans
"was enacted to prevent directors from taking advantage of their position to grant themselves or
their colleagues unwarranted loans, and thus dissipate corporate funds in violation of their
trust.").
5. ALASKA STAT.§ 10.05.213 (1987) (loans to officers or directors prohibited); D.C.
CODE ANN.§ 29-304(6) (1981) (same); NEB. REv. STAT.§ 21-2045 (1983) (same); Arkansas withholds authority for many of its domiciliary corporations to "enter into contracts of guaranty of
suretyship or make other financial arrangements ... for the benefit of ... its employees [where such
employees are also} officer[s] or director[s] or any person holding as much as 10% of the shares
entitled to vote for the election of directors." ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 4-26-204(b)(3) ( 1987) (applicable
to corporations formed before Dec. 31, 1987). Several states, while not expressly prohibiting executive loans, presumably discourage them by imposing personal liability on directors who approve
such loans. E.g .. CAL. CoRP. CoDE§ 316 (West 1987); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 33-32I(c) (West
1987); D.C. CoDE ANN.§ 29-342 (1981); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 62 (West Supp. 1987);
Mo. ANN. STAT.§ 351.165 (Vernon Supp. 1987); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:6-ll (West Supp. 1986);
OHio REv. CODE ANN.§ 1701.95 (Anderson 1985 & Supp. 1986); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. §
23A.08.450(2) (Supp. 1987); WIS. STAT.§ 180.40(l)(d) (1985-1986).
The United Kingdom prohibits most corporate loans and guarantees of loans made by
others ·to directors. Companies Act § 330 ( 1985). Canada prohibits loans or "any financial assistance" to shareholders or directors, with limited exceptions. R.S.C. § C-32 § C-32 § 17(1) (1970).
Congress has prohibited executive loans in a number of federally chartered corporations. See, e.g.,
36 U.S.C. § 234 (1981) (Reserve Officers' Association); 36 U.S.C. § 415 (198 I) (Conference of State
Societies); 36 U.S.C. § 439(b) (1981) (Conference of Citizenship); 36 U.S.C. § 579(b) (198 I) (Federal Bar Association).
6. CAL. CORP. CoDE§ 315 (West Supp. 1987) (corporations with less than 100 shareholders prohibited from making loans to officers or directors unless the loan or an authorized
employee benefit plan is approved by the shareholders); CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 7-3-101(1)(1) (1986)
(requires affirmative 2/3 vote of shareholders to authorize a loan to a director, unless articles of
incorporation dictate otherwise); N.J. STAT. ANN.§ 14A:6-ll (West Supp. 1986) (loans to directors
are limited to those granted pursuant to employee benefit plans adopted by the shareholders or
reflected in the certificate of incorporation or by-laws adopted by the shareholders); N.Y. Bus.
CoRP. LAw§ 714 (McKinney 1986) (any loan to a director must be approved by the shareholders);
N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 55-22 (1983) (any loan to a director, officer or dominant shareholder must be
approved by the shareholders); UTAH CODE ANN.§ 16-10-43 (1987) (loans to directors or officers
require consent of the shareholders).
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provide some "benefit" to the corporation. 7 Eight states, either expressly or implicitly, have abandoned all limitations on executive
loans. 8
This Article looks critically at the statutes which have authorized
executive loans, and the loan:.making experience of corporations in recent years. It focuses in particular on the "benefit" standard for executive loans which has been adopted in twenty-eight states. When is a loan
made to a corporate director to the exclusion of other corporate opportunities deemed to be "beneficial" to the corporation? By what standards should this determination be made and, if challenged, reviewed?
Because there is little case law in this area; 9 corporate directors called
upon to make such a determination have been forced to act without
guidance, with predictably self-serving results.
7. The Delaware General Corporation Law curren-tly provides:
Any corporation may lend money to, or guarantee any obligation of, or otherwise
assist any officer or other employee of the corpor~tion or of its subsidiary, including any
officer or employee who is a director of the corporation or its subsidiary, whenever in the
judgment of the directors, such loan, guaranty or assistance may reasonably be expected
to benefit the corporation .. ..
DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (1983). See also ALA. CooE§ 10-2A-69 (1987); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 10-047 (1977); ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 4-27-302 (.1987) (applicable to corporations formed after Dec.
31, 1987 and corporations formed before that date which elect coverage unde~ the BUSINESS CoRPORATION AcT OF 1987); CAL. CoRP. CooE § 315 (West Supp. 1987) (applies only to corporations
with 100 or more shareholders which have adopted a charter provision authorizing board approval, and also applies only to loans to officers, not directors); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 607. 141 (West
Supp. 1987); IDAHO CooE § 30-1-47 (1980); IND. CooE ANN. § 23-1-35-3 (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA
CooE ANN. § 496A.4.6 (West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN.§ 17-6303 (1981); Kv. REv . STAT.
ANN.§ 271A.235 (MichiejBobbs-Merri111981); Mo. CoRPS. & Ass'NsCooE ANN.§ 2-416 (1985);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.1548 (West 1973); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 302A.501 (West 1985);
MoNT. CooE ANN. § 35-1-415 (1987); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 293-A:47 (Supp. 1986); N.J. STAT.
ANN.§ 14A:6-Il (West Supp ... l986) (statute also requires, in the case of loans to directors, that
they be made pursuant to a provision in the certificate of incorporation, by-laws approved by the
shareholders or a plan adopted by the shareholders); N.D. CENT. CooE § 10-19.1"89 (1985); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 118, § 1029 (1984); OR. REV. STAT.§ 57.226 (1983); R .I. GEN. LAWS§ 7-1.1-42
(1985); S.C . CooE ANN. § 33-13-170 (Law. Co-op 1987); S.D. Cot;>IFIED LAWS ANN. § 47-2-65
(1983); TENN. CODE ANN. § 48-18-303 (Supp. 1987); WASH. REV . CODE ANN. § 23A.08.445 (Supp.
1987); W. VA. CooE § 31-1-101 (1982); Wvo. STAT. § 17-1-140.1 (Supp. 1986).
Georgia requires director approval for executive loans, but. imposes no "benefit" requirement. GA. CooE ANN. § 14-5-5 (1982). Texas imposes a benefit requirement, but fails to -specify
director approval. TEx. Bus. CoRP. AcT ANN. art. 2.02(6) (Vernon Supp. 1987). Massachusetts
absolves authorizing directors of personal liability for unrepaid loans where they have approved or
ratified them based upon a finding of corporate "benefit." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 156B, § 62
(West Supp. 1987). Connecticut absolves its directors where the loan was made "primarily for a
legitimate business purpose of the corporation." CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 33-321(c) (West 1987).
8. Express authority: HAW. REv. STAT.§ 416-26(7) (1985); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para
3. 10(f) (Smith-Hurd 1985); ME. REv . STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A. § 202(1)(m) (1981); MISS. CooE ANN.
§ 79-4-3 .02 (Supp. 1987); N .M. STAT. ANN. § 53-ll-4F (1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. II,§ 1852(6)
(1984). Implied authority: 15 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. tit.l5, § 1302(9) (Purdon Supp. 1987); VA.
CooE ANN. § 13. 1-627 (Supp. 1985).
9. See infra notes 87-96, 98 and accompanying text.
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The author recently reviewed the proxy statements of fifty-five
publicly traded American corporations which had extended substantial
loans to or maintained substantial credit relationships with their executives in fiscal year 1986. This Article explores the purposes for and the
terms of the loans made. and weighs these experiences against various
concepts of corporate "benefit." The Article concludes that, as currently viewed by corporate management, the so-called "benefit" limitations on loans to directors and officers imposed by the majority of the
state enabling statutes are illusory.
.
In effect, the enabling statutes, while purporting to impose limitations on the circumstances in which executive loans are permissible,
have created a standardless atmosphere in which those loans are freely
made. And by encouraging the making of executive loans, these statutes have provided managers with their most accessible mechanism for
implementing the "agency problem." 10
Given especially the recent experiences of regulated financial institutions with excessive grants of insider loans-now recognized as a
principal predictor of bank insolvency 11 -the executive loan enabling
statutes, aimed at wholly unregulated and inexperienced lenders, warrant thoughtful reconsideration.
II. A

HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE ON INSIDER LoANS

Early corporate law was straightforward: Unless a corporation
lent money as its regular business, it was prohibited from making loans.
"In most cases," one early commentator pointed out,
the business of a corporation is to invest and use its capital
and not to loan it out. Accordingly, it is well settled that only
where the business of the corporation is such as usually involves loaning does the corporation have the right to loan its
funds. 12
10. Professor Brudney has characterized the "agency problem" as the "temptation [of
corporate management] to shirk in its performance or to divert corporate assets to itself.... "
Brudney, Corporate Governance. Agency Costs and the Rhetoric of Contract. 85 CoLUM. L. REv.
1403, 1406 (1985). "An important factor in the survival of organizational forms is control of
agency problems." Fama & Jensen, Agency Problems and Residual Claims. 26 J. L. & EcoN. 327
(1983).
II. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
12. 2 W. COOK, A TREATISE ON STOCK AND STOCKHOLDERS, BONDS, MORTGAGES AND
GENERAL CORPORATION LAw 982 (3d ed. 1894). See also Leigh v. American Brake Beam Co., 205
Ill. 147, 151, 68 N.E. 713, 715 (1903) ("A corporation cannot make loans of money unless the
exercise of its chartered powers ordinarily includes such loans. The business of this corporation
was to invest and use its capital in making and selling brake beams and other railroad appliances
and to distribute its profits as dividends, and it had no power to loan its money or capital.").
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This view was later modified by the recognition that a business
sometimes had to lend money, or extend credit to its customers, in.order to succeed in the marketplace. Like the implied power to borrow
money in aid of express corporate powers, corporations were found to
have an implied power to lend under.limited circumstan<~es:
Thus, a water company may make advances to a contractor to
enable him to construct its works~ or to another company engaged in constructing ditches and laying pipes, in order to obtain an additional supply of water required by it; mining
· company may advance money to a tunnel company to put in
drains which will aid the lender in drawing water from its
mine; and a ·warehouse company may advance money to
growers of the product stored with it, or in which it deals. 13

a

The guiding principle, however, was that the power to ma~e loans
was only incidental to the corporation's express powers, and therefore a
non-bank corporation could not make loans other than to advance the
limited business purpose for which it had been created. 14 In addition, a
corporation could purchase short-term debt instruments, but only as a
means of gaining a return on surplus funds. 15
A few courts, broadly construing these impiied corporate powers,
permitted loans to directors or officers where there was no fraud and no
showing that the funds could have been invested at a more substantial
interest yield. 16 Most states, however, took a more conservative view.
From very early in the development of state chartering laws, corporate
statutes either forbade the grant of executive loans altogether, 17 or created substantial disincentives by enSuring that creditors of corporations
whose directors approved such loans had recourse against the approving officials in the event the loans remained unpaid. 18 These early provi13. 6 W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS§ 2619 (rev.
perm . ed. 1979).
14. /d. Of course, corporations whose normal line of business was banking were empowered to make loans to their directors. See, e.g., Lindemann v. Rusk, 125 Wis. 210, 104 N .W. 119
( 1905).
15. 6 W. FLETCHER, supra note 13, at§ 2620; Garrison Canning Co. v. Stanley, 133 Iowa
57, 110 N.W. 171 (1907).
16. Felsenheld v. Block Bros. Tobacco Co., 119 W. Va. 167, 176, 192 S.E. 545, 549
(1937). Perhaps it should be noted that West Virginia was kn·own to be a very pro-management
jurisdiction at one time, referred to by some as the " Snug Harbor for roaming and piratical corporations" or the " Mecca of irresponsible corporations." 2 W. CooK, supra note 12, at 1604.
17. See, e.g .. N.Y. LAw, ch. 40, § 14 (1848)("No loan of money shall be made by any ...
company to any stockholder therein."), quoted in Nellis C:o. v. Nellis, 16 N.Y.S. 545, 547 (1891).
"The principal object of that provision is to prevent a reducing of the capital under cover of loans
to stockholders. It is intended for the protection of creditors." /d.
18. See Annotation, Construction and Application of Statutes Making Corporate Officers
or Directors Liable in Respect of Loans or Advances to Stockholders or Officers, 129 A.L.R. 1258
( 1940). An early example of such a statute is MASS. GEN. L. ch. 106, § 60 (1882), which provided
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sions derived from traditional trust principles 19 and represented a
pointed response to the self-dealing excesses of the special charter
experience. 20
The state enactments took diverse forms over the years, with some
prohibiting loans to directors and officers but not to shareholders and
others prohibiting loans to shareholders but not to directors and officers. 21 One state prohibited loans to directors and shareholders but
failed to regulate loans to officers, while two others prohibited loans to
officers and shareholders, omitting any reference to directors. 22
But regardless of the drafting idiosyncracies distinguishing them,
the intent of the statutes prohibiting executive loans was clear. The
rhetoric accompanying their enforcement was rich with references to
"unscrupulous directors [with] the power to deplete the assets of a corporation by borrowing money .... " 23 One commentator characterized
these statutes as "the principal deterrent to a dissipation of corporate
assets .... " 24
Critics occasionally pointed to analytical deficiencies in the prohibitory statutes, suggesting, for example, that if their intended purpose
was protection against the dissipation of capital, such provisions were
that a corporation's president and its directors would be jointly and severally liable "for debts
contracted between the time of making or assenting to a loan to a stockholder and the time of its
repayment, to the extent of such a loan." Old Colony Boot & Shoe Co. v. Parker-Sampson-Adams
Co., 183 Mass. 557, 559, 67 N .E. 870, 871 (1903). Many statutes combined both a prohibition
against , and director liability to ensure repayment of, executive loans. See, e.g., the 1848 New
York statute, supra note 17, quoted in Nellis Co. v. Nellis, 16 N.Y .S. at 549: "No loan shall be
made by [a] company to any stockholder therein; and if any such loan shall be made to a stockholder the officers who shall make it, or who shall assent thereto, shall be jointly and severally
liable to the extent of such loan and interest for all debts contracted before the repayment of the
sum so loaned."
Maryland raised the stakes by providing that "no loan of money shall be made by any ...
corporation to any stockholder therein, and that if any such loan shall be made to any stockholder
the officer or officers who shall make it, or who shall assent thereto, shall be jointly and severally
liable for all the debts of the corporation contracted before the making of said loan; to the extent of
double the amount of said loan." Mo. ANN. CooE art. 23, § 69, quoted in Fisher v. Parr, 92 Md.
245, 274-75. 48 A. 621 , 627 (1901).
The issue most frequently arising out of such statutes was whether a particular officer of
director had " assented" to the granting of the loan . See , e.g., Murray v. Smith, 224 N .Y. 40, 120
N.E. 60 (1918).
19. J. PERRY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES§ 453 (2d ed. 1874). See
Phillips, Managerial Misuse of Property: The Synthesizing Thread in Corporate Doctrine, 32
RuTGERS L. REv. 184, 187-90 ( 1979). A seminal case articulating the application of trust principles
to corporate conduct arose out of the extension of credit to a shareholder to enable him to purchase his stock. Upton v. Tribilcock, 91 U.S. 45 (1875).
20. See L. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 446-47, 448-55 (1973).
21. Rich, Corporate Loans to Officers, Directors and Shareholders, 14 Bus. LAW. 658.659
( 1959).
22. /d.
23. Wulljen v. Dolton, 24 Cal. 2d 891,896, 151 P.2d 846,849 (Cal. 1944); In re Wood's
Estate, 299 Mich. 635, 647, I N .W.2d 19, 24 (1941).
24. Rich, supra note 21, at 658.
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overinclusive 25 or, where their coverage excluded certain parties-for
example, prohibiting loans to directors and officers, but not to shareholders-they were underinclusive. 26 More pointedly, critics suggested
that adoption of restrictions on executive loans added little to existing
common law rights to recover in the event of managerial breach of the
duty of care. 27
·
To be sure, shareholders and creditors were not without remedy
even where no prohibitory statutes existed. 28 Nonetheless, the prohibitory statutes grew in popularity, particula,rly with. the circulation of the
Model Business Corporation Act in 1946 and its adoption in 1950. 29
25. Comment, Corporations-General Effect of Statutes Prohibiting Corporate Loans to
Directors, Officers and Stockholders, 48 MICH. L REV. 213, 215 (1949).
26. /d. at 218.
27. /d. at 214.
28. E.g .. Milam v. Cooper, 258 S.W.2d 953, 957 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953) (defendant purchased controlling share in corporation, paying for stock by tendering a $292,954 note secured by
his shares and repayable in 15 years at 2%% interest; the note was approved by the board of
directors; court found that the loan "was not incide!Jtal to or in furtherance of the purposes for
which the corporation was organized, or even to the interest of the corporation, but to the contrary
was a loan which was wholly and solely to the furtherance of Milam's personal interest, and ambition to control [the company]"; Bromschwig v. Carthage Marble & White Lime Co., 334 Mo. 319,
66 S.W.2d 889 (1933) (director/general manager took interest-free loan from company in order to
acquire stock, without authority and without the knowledge of the directors or stockholders. Even
though the loans were later repaid, court requires an accounting); Backus v. Finkelstein, 23 F.2d
357, 361 (D. Minn. 1927) and 23 F.2d 531 (D. Minn. 1924) (the "continued and frequent abstraction of large sums of money from the treasury of the corporation by [corporate executives} for use
in their private ventures" forms basis for an order of accounting and appointment of a special
receiver). But see Tovrea Land and Cattle Co. v. Linsenmeyer, 100 Ariz. 107, 134-35,412 P.2d 47,
66 (1966) (defendant purchased another shareholder's shares, financing the purchase by making a
4% secured loan with the corporation; court finds no evidence that this loan was "unfair" and
declines to find a breach of fiduciary duty). See also R. S. Corson Co. v. Hartman, 144 W.Va. 790,
Ill S.E.2d 346 ( 1959) (loan to president, approved by the board, to enable him to purchase shares
owned by the same board members, held not fraudulent as to creditors); Paddock v. Siemoneit,
147 Tex. 571, 576, 218 S.W.2d 428,431 (1949) (president's numerous withdrawals and loans from
corporate funds were made during a time when the corporation was solvent. "There was no attempt to conceal [them] from any creditor .... His indebtedness to the corporation was disclosed
on statements furnished to the principal creditors and they made no objection." The loans were
made with shareholder consent. Therefore the loans did not reflect any breach of fiduciary duty);
Davies v. Meisenheimer, 254 Wis. 419, 37 N.W.2d 93 (1949) (new shareholder cannot challenge
earlier corporate loans made to the president/treasurer with the contemporaneous approval of all
the shareholders, absent a showing of fraud or evidence that the board in its refusal to call the
loans has not exercised business judgment); Bailey v. Jacobs, 325 Pa. 187, 190, 196, 199, 189 A.
320, 323, 325, 326 (1937) (president/director of corporation engaged in a series of "wholly reprehensible" transactions, including "the withdrawal by him, on a large scale, of funds of the [company] and their use in the purchase of stock of other shareholders upon which he subsequently
made enormous profits." These loans, defendant alleged, represented a "general practice" of corporate loans to other officers and directors. Substantial recovery was thwarted by the running of
the statute of limitations).
29. Marsh, Are Directors Trustees? Conflict of Interest and Corporate Morality, 22 Bus.
LAW. 35, 68-69 (1966); Rich, supra note 21, at 658; Folk, Corporation Statutes 1959-1966, 1966
DUKE L.J. 875, 876 n, I.
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A. The Development of Modern Enabling Statutes

Even as the number of states adopting prohibitory statutes grew, a
countertrend developed, mirroring in great respect the movement ·
toward judicial approval of executive self-dealing transactions other
than loans. 30 Michigan apparently was the first state to enact, in 1931, a
statute specifically permitting loans to directors, officers and shareholders, but it was a cautious one, requiring the affirmative vote of twothirds of a disinterested board for approval, and subsequent full disclosure to shareholders. 31 Other states followed, with more or less restrictive variations on this theme. 32
In 1967, Delaware adopted by far the most liberal enabling statute,
permitting corporate loans to be made to officers and employees (including those who were also directors) with or without interest and secured or unsecured as the directors (not only "disinterested" directors)
saw fit. 33 This statute merely required a finding by the board that "such
loan, guaranty or assistance may reasonably be expected to benefit the
corporation .... " 34
Other states quickly followed, and in 1969 the American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Laws, "after lengthy review of the
30.

Marsh, supra note 29, at 57; Phillips, supra note 19, at 187-92.

31.
No officer or director of a corporation, other than a corporation an integral part of
whose business permits it to make loans, shall either directly or indirectly authorize,
consent to, make or allow any loan or advance to or overdraft or withdrawal by an
officer, director or shareholder of such corporation out of its funds otherwise than in the
ordinary and usual course of the business of the corporation and on the ordinary and
usual terms of payments and security unless each such loan, advance, overdraft or withdrawal is approved by the vote of at least two-thirds of all the members of the board of
directors of the corporation excluding any director obtaining such loan or advance or
making such withdrawal or overdraft. A full and detailed statement of all such loans,
advances, overdrafts and withdrawals and repayments thereof shall be submitted at the
next annual meeting of shareholders and the aggregate amount of such loans, advance,
overdrafts and withdrawals and repayments thereof shall be stated on the next annual
report to shareholders.
1931 Mich. Pub. Acts 327, quoted in In re Wood's Estate, 299 Mich. 635,644, I N.W.2d 19,23
(1941).
32. Cf TENN. CODE ANN.§§ 48-1-814 (1984) (loans to directors or officers require consent of the shareholders) and 48-1-815(2) (1984) (directors approving loans notwithstanding the
foregoing remain personally liable on the unpaid balance); CAL. Clv. CODE§ 366 (requiring consent to any loan to directors, officers or shareholders by the holders of two-thirds of all classes of
shares other than the shares held by the benefited borrower), quoted in Wulfjen v. Dolton, 24 Cal.
2d 818, 885, 151 P.2d 840, 843 (Cal. 1944):
33. W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS§ 2.12 (2d ed. 1973).
34. See supra note 7. There is no question that this enabling provision was regarded as a
"fmancial plum" for managers. Comment, Law for Sale: A Study of the Delaware Corporation Law
of 1967, 117 U. PA. L. REV. 861,873 (1969). Professor Folk, who served as Reporter for the 1967
revision, later commented that, even though he regarded himself as "pro-management," he
thought the loan enabling provision was "overly liberal." /d. at 865, 874 n.l02.
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subject," 35 revised the Model Business Corporation Act to delete its
longstanding prohibition against executive loans. 36
There is little useful legislative history to these enabling provisions,
although there is some indication that Delaware's statute and some
modeled after it were initially adopted merely to accommodate the temporary needs of "salaried qfficers and officer-directors who [were] being
moved about the country with greater frequency and often upon short
notice by management. ... " 37 As will be seen presently, 38 the purposes
for which executive loans are now being granted greatly exceed those
initial, modest prospects. 39
·
35.
36.

Scott, Changes in the Model Business Corporation Act, 24 Bus. LAW. 291,292 (1968).
The 1969 MBCA formulation read:
A corporation shall not lend money to or use its credit to assist its directors without authorization in the particular case by its shareholders, but may lend money to and
use its credit to assist any employee of the corporation or of a subsidiary, including any
such employee who is a director of the corporation, if the board of directors decides that
such loan or assistance may benefit the corporation. ·
MoDEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT§ 47 (1969). This provision was later amended both in substan·ce and
in form to provide:
·
[A] corporation may not lend money to or guarantee the obligation of a director of the
corporation unless:
(I) the particular loan or guarantee is approved by a majority of the votes
represented by the outstanding voting shares of all classes, voting as a single voting
group, except the votes of shares owned by or voted under the control of the benefited director; or
(2) the eorporation 's board of directors determines that the loan or guarantee
benefits the corporation and either approves the specific loan or guarantee or a general plan authorizing loans and guarantees.
REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT§ 8.32 (1984).
37. Oberhelman v. Barnes Inv. Corp., 236 Kan. 335, 341, 690 P.2d 1343, 1349 (1984)
(quoting from the legislative commentary on adoption in 1972 of K.S.A. 17-6303).
38. See infra Appendix II.
39. The acceptable purposes for which loans could be made, as delineated by state drafting committees or publishing house commentators, expanded rapidly. By the time the ABA Committee on Corporate Laws incorporated an executive loan enabling provision into the Model Business Corporation Act in 1969-just two years after the Delaware enactment-the reporter
commented that executive loans now appropriately could be made for broader purposes than
merely facilitating executive relocations:
[T]he Committee has reversed its earlier position. Contemporary business requirements
of moving officers from one place to another, the development of stock purchase plans,
and other ways of creating financial needs [sic], justify the making of loans to officers in
many cases.
Scott, supra note 35, at 292.
This apparent drift toward greater discretion continued. When California revised its
enabling provision in 1975, its legislative committee indicated a willingness to accept loans made
generally for "the purpose of assisting the corporation in attracting and retaining the services of
qualified persons." CAL. CORP. CoDE§ 315, comment b (West 1977). An anonymous commentator
extended even further this broad view of what constituted appropriate circumstances for making
an executive loan when Minnesota enacted its enabling provision in 1981:
[T]he power of the corporation to loan money to those persons or businesses connected with the corporation is a useful tool for the protection of the economic interest of
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Concurrent with the development of state enabling laws were developments in federal tax law which encouraged corporate loans to directors and officers. There developed, for example, a substantial incentive for executives to accept low-interest or interest-free loans in lieu of
taxable compensation. 40 Only recently have changes in the tax laws
acted to create disincentives to the use of below-market corporate loans
for this purpose. 41
,
In addition, the widespread use by corporations of stock options
as an executive perquisite 42 soon led to the mechanism of granting a
corporate loan to enable executives in possession of options to exercise
them. 43 Even though these loans are costly to the corporation due to
the need to comply with regulations imposed under both tax and federal banking laws, 44 the practice of making loans to accommodate the
exercise of stock options has become nearly as routine as the practice of
granting the options.
that corporation and a useful incentive with which to attract top management or assure
future growth.
(T]he loan or guaranty can be a valuable factor in the retention of experienced
management or the hiring of promising personnel. The board may make these loans for
any purpose, as long as it reasonably expects the corporation to directly or indirectly
benefit from the transaction through better performance by current employees or better
personnel.
Reporter's Notes to MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 302A.501 (West 1985).
40. A. SPORN & V. ROTHSCHILD, EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION-PLANNING, PRACTICE, DEVELOPMENTS 237 (PLI 1984). See generally Closius& Chapman, Below Market Loans: From Abuse
to Misuse-A Sports Illustration, 37 CASE W.REs. L. REv. 484, 485, 488-89 (1987).
41. See I.R.C. § 7872 (1984) (Tax Reform Act of 1984) (treating below market loans as
interest-bearing, and (I) taxing such loans, including the value of the forgone interest, to corporate
employees as income, and (2) permitting the employees to take deductions for interest as if it had
been paid); see also Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514 (1986) (amending I.R.C. § 163(d)
to eliminate the deduction for personal interest payments); Comment, The Taxation of InterestFree Loans, 61 TuL. L. REv. 849, 851, 884-88 (1987); Closius & Chapman, supra note 40, at 496506; Willbanks, Interest Free Loans Are No Longer Free: Tax Consequences of Business Loans, 47
MoNT. L. REv. 335, 340-45 (1986); Chvisuk, Taxation of Loans Having Below-Market Interest
Rates, 21 IDAHO L. REv. 257, 269-70 (1985). Note that loans secured by a mortgage on a relocated
employee's new residence, granted in connection with the employee's transfer to a new principal
place of work, are not covered by section 7872. Relocation Loan Notes Subject to New Rules on
Below-Market Interest Loans, 63 J. TAx'N 240 (1985); Prop. Treas. Reg.§ 1.7872-5, 50 Fed. Reg. at
33,561-2 (1985) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. § 7872).
42. A. SPORN & V. ROTHSCHILD, supra note 40, at I08; R. NADER, M. GREEN & J. SELIGMAN, TAMING THE GIANT CORPORATION 115 (1976) ("Nearly every large industrial corporation
offers its top executives stock options.").
43. A. SPORN & V, ROTHSCHILD, supra note 40, at 123.
44. Id. at 124-25. Regulation G of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, 12 C.F.R. § 207.1-.7 (1984), provides that non-bank lenders who extend or maintain ~redit
secured directly or indirectly by margin stock must register and file contemporaneous lending
reports with the Federal Reserve, 12 C.F.R. § 207.3(a), maintain specific Fed-required records
regarding margin loans, 12 C.F.R. § 207.3(e), and file annual reports with their local Federal Reserve bank, 12 C.F.R. § 207.3(o), (p).
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B. Executive Loans and the Agency Problem
The states' encouragement of executive loans has expanded the
available opportunities for managerial abuse. 45 Of course even where
prohibitory statutes previously were in effect, managers for years misappropriated corporate funds and, when caught, retrospectively characterized them as "loans." 46 But the enactment of the loan enabling
provisions meant that this conduct no longer had to be clandestine.
Accordingly, the extra-compensatory transfer of corporate funds to executives has flourished, sometimes with adverse results for shareholders
and others. 47
There are often grave results for the managers as well. Corporate
funds have been transferred to managers and later challenged by the
Internal Revenue Service on the ground that they were not bona fide
loans at all, but represented a subterfuge to permit the "borrower" to
avoid paying taxes on income received in the form of compensation or
dividends. 48 Other transactions, while recognized as bona fide "loans,"
45. Other mechanisms regularly used to facilitate the "agency problem" include transfers of property to and from the corporation, side agreements regarding compensation (such as
"consulting" agreements with outside directors), nepotic transfers (through employment or other
financial support of managers' family members) and other contractual transfers. See Barnard,
Curbing Management Conflicts of Interest-The Search for an Effective Deterrent, 40 RUTGERS L.
REV. 369 (1988).
46. Some of the most poignant examples of this conduct occurred during the great crash
of 1929 when corporate officials with signature authority wrote corporate checks to cover their
personal margin calls, believing or hoping that they would be able to repay the corporate funds.
These circumstances led to charges of "widespread speculation by corporate officers of funds committed to their keeping," and numerous cases involving competing claims for proceeds of the
checks. See Note, Bills and Notes-Corporations-Diversion of Corporate Funds to Private Purposes, 8 N.Y.U.L.Q. 481,481 (1931).
47. See, e.g., Robertson v. White, 633 F. Supp. 954 (W.O. Ark. 1986) (general manager
of incorporated agricultural co-operative secured board approval for low-interest, unsecured
loans to his speculative personal business venture amounting to $3.8 million; the board members
also granted themselves no-interest loans. Ultimately the co-op filed for reorganization under the
Bankruptcy Act, the general manager was convicted of tax fraud, and the co-op members resorted
to suit under the federal securities laws).
48. See, e.g., Busch v. Commissioner, 728 F.2d 945 (7th Cir. 1984) (sole shareholder of
corporation withdrew $300,000 and tendered non-interest-bearing uncollateralized notes; court
found no contemporaneous intent to repay, and treated the advances as constructive dividends);
Dolese v. United States, 605 F.2d 1146 (lOth Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 961 (1980) (court
treated periodic withdrawals by sole shareholder cumulating to $1,817,133 as constructive dividends); Oyster Shell Prods. Corp. v. Commissioner, 313 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1963) (shareholders of
closely held corporation found to have received constructive dividends notwithstanding corporate
records reflecting their indebtedness); Lewis v. Commissioner, 50 T.C.M. (CCH) 1414 (1985);
Rapoport v. Commissioner, 47 T.C.M. (CCH) 205 (1983); Piekos v. Commissioner, 44 T.C.M.
(CCH) 1401 (1982); Pizzarelli v. Commissioner, 40 T.C.M. (CCH) 156 (1980); Smith v. Commissioner, 39 T.C.M. (CCH) 900 (1980); McLemore v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 259 (1973)
Holman v. Commissioner, 32 T.C.M. (CCH) 1323 (1973); Electric & Neon, Inc. v. Commissioner,
56 T.C. 1324 (1971), a./f'd mem., 496 F. 2d 876 (5th Cir. 1974); Chesapeake Mfg. Co. v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. (CCH) 1285, 1292-93 (1964). Of course, conclusions reached in IRS audits re-
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have successfully been challenged for failure to satisfy the "benefit limitations" of the state enabling statutes. 49 The extension of executive
loans has played a prominent role in a number of corporate insolvencies 50 and even a few criminal proceedings. 51
Closely held corporations today regularly make executive and insider loans, 52 often without regard to corporate formalities. 53 Publicly
garding the taxation of various corporate expenditures are not conclusive in a derivative action
challenging-the expenditures. See Sugarman v. Sugarman, 797 f.2d 3, II (1st Cir. 1986).
49. See infra notes 87-96 and accompanying text.
50. E.g., American Nat'! Bank of Austin v. Mortgageamerica Corp. (In re Mortgageamerica Corp.), 714 F.2d 1266, 1268 (5th Cir. 1983) (creditor sued controlling shareholder of
a corporation in chapter 7 proceeding, asserting a right to recover from him personally under the
"trust fund doctrine." Among. the plaintiff's allegations were that the defendant had caused the
company to make various loans to defendant and entities controlled by him, totalling $2,300,000);
Levy v. Runnells (In re Landbank Equity Corp.), 66 Bankr. 949, 962 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1986)
(trustee's suit against controlling shareholders of a second mortgage company alleged loans to
them and relatives totalling $1.6 million, plus forgone points totalling $629,344; court found that
the defendants "took, moved property around, favored themselves, and bled the company to
death for their own selves' sake. If exemplary damages are not here clearly proper, there has never
existed a case where they were."); McLemore v. Olson (In reB & L Laboratories, Inc.), 62 Bankr.
494,510, (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) (suit by trustee in bankruptcy to pierce the corporate veil and
recover losses from director/shareholders was successful, the court noting that defendants had
"plundered the assets of [the corporation]," leaving it with liabilities in excess of $2,000,000, by a
variety of means, including making loans to directors and officers without formal shareholder
approval); Lowder v. All Star Mills, Inc., 301 N.C. 561,573,273 S.E.2d 247,254 (N.C. 1981) (nonmanagement shareholders entitled to receivership where, among other acts of misappropriation,
the chief executive officer borrowed "large sums of money from several of the corporations, and
these transactions were never approved by the shareholders or the directors, as required by [applicable North Carolina law].").
51. See United States v. Curtis, 782 F.2d 593 (6th Cir. 1986) (sole proprietor charged
with tax evasion defended his nonpayment on the ground that receipt of checks payable to his
business but deposited into his personal account represented interest-free loans, rather than taxable income).
52. E.g., Bricklin v. Stengol Corp., I Conn. App. 656, 660, 476 A.2d 584, 587 (1984)
(corporation's $10,000 loan to start-up business owned by directors' wives found to be "unfair" to
the corporation and voided). See also Jacobs, Taking It To the Street, Wall St. J., Special Report
on Small Business, May 19, 1986, at 31 D (Crazy Eddie, Inc., during its pre-public existence, "had
made interest-free loans totalling $470,000 to some of the [members of the chairman's family]. It
had paid two of their wives $75,000 each. And the New York-area company was owed more than
$3 million by other [family] enterprises, including a son-in-law's audio and videocasette business
with the concession to sell tapes in Crazy Eddie Stores. A shoe store chain, which had filed a
petition under federal bankruptcy law, controlled by another relative had $500,000 of its debts
guaranteed by Crazy Eddie.").
53. See, e.g., Levin v. Levin, 43 Md. App. 380, 389,405 A.2d 770,777 (1979) (president
of a close corporation was shown to have "borrowed almost $100,000.00 from [the company),
drawing checks upon the corporate funds either to himself or in payment of personal obligations.
He stated that the borrowings were without knowledge or approval of the directors of the corporation [his wife and daughter] and without any form of corporate resolution or authority."); Speer v.
Dighton Grain, Inc., 229 Kan. 272, 274, 276, 624 P.2d 952, 954, 955 (1981) (manager/director of
close corporation had "written some $87,000 in corporate checks to himself and had restored only
a portion of that amount to the corporate account." Only after the auditors protested, did he
tender a $54,000 unsecured note for the remaining balance.); Newton v. Hornblower, Inc., 224
Kan. 506, 518, 582 P.2d 1136, 1145-46 (i978) (officers of close corporation were found to have
used corporate funds for payment of insurance premiums on themselves and members of their
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held companies with serious financial problems frequently have substantial amounts outstanding in executive loans. 54 One might argue
from these examples that the executive loan enabling statutes have represented a wrongheaded development in corporate law and ought to be
repealed. Surely such a gesture would simplify the task of monitoring
management.
But the development of the state enabling acts has not inexorably
led to managerial overreaching; it has merely facilitated it. Undoubtedly the vast majority of executive loans authorized pursuant to statute
have been duly repaid and, apart from what they may have represented
in the way of opportunity costs, caused no harm to shareholders or
creditors. Indeed, those loans which were repaid at a competitive rate of
interest may have represented an optimum corporate investment.
Moreover, much of the managerial misappropriation uncovered in
these cases may well have appeared in some other guise had the loan
enabling provisions not been in existence.
Still, the existence of the loan enabling statutes has provided a
tempting mechanism for executives bent on self-enrichment at the expense of minority shareholders or creditors or both. 55 This is particularly true of those corporations which are not subject to oversight by
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). In these corporations
executive loans, whether abusive or not, are not required to be disclosed
families, excessive travel expenses and other personal expenses, totalling $90,000. "During the
course of the trial, the defendants admitted some 100 payments had been made by error from the
corporation or partnership but contended they were honest mistakes and defendants were willing
to account for them.").
54. For example, during ftscal year 1985, in which Allegheny International, Inc. lost a
record $109 million, it made $32.3 million in loans to its officers and directors, repayable at a 2%
rate of interest. Of this amount, $21.9 million was loaned for purposes of stock acquisition, while
$10.4 million was loaned "for other things." Symonds, Big Trouble at Allegheny, BusiNESS WEEK,
Aug. II, 1986, at 60. LTV, Inc., during a year in which it lost $378.2 million and was forced to
close its Pennsylvania manufacturing operations, made an interest-free loan of $965,250 to its
chairman/CEO to enable him to exercise his stock options. "[He] apparently had not been able to
save enough on his annual salary of$743,315." Olasky, The Public Relations Scams of 1985, 1986
Bus. & Soc'v REv. 52. Horn & Hardart Co., which in 1986 lost $28.4 million, and whose share
value has dropped by more than half since 1983, in 1984 made (and recently extended) a $100,000
"personal loan" to its executive vice president and a $154,700 loan to its vice-chairman to permit
his investment in a casino. Leonard, Why Didn't They Pay Him to Stay Home?. FoRBES, June 15,
1987, at 120-21; Horn & Hardart Co., Proxy Statement, at 12 (May 14, 1987). See also Maher v.
Zapata Corp., 714 F.2d 436, 440, 442, 445 (5th Cir. 1983) (publicly held corporation suffering
declining earnings is beset by derivative suits alleging mismanagement and violation of the federal
securities laws, including assertions that interest-free loans to six senior corporate officers to permit exercise of stock options and to cover tax liabilities in connection therewith, constituted
waste).
55. Unlike other conflict of interest mechanisms, executive loans do not require an exchange of goods or services whose value is subject to comparative valuation or independent
appraisal.

HeinOnline -- 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 249 1988

250

WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW

to shareholders 56 and thus go undetected unless insolvency results and
a receiver steps in. 57
Even some enterprises governed by the disclosure requirements of
the federal securities laws, however, make lending decisions which, at
least from a prudent lending perspective, can only be considered highly
questionable, particularly in the context of overall corporate performance. What follows is an examination of the current lending practices of
some of these companies.
III.

HOW THE STATUTES HAVE BEEN APPLIED-AN EMPIRICAL VIEW
OF CORPORATE LOANS TODIRECTORS AND OFFICERS

The author recently reviewed the executive lending practices of 152
publicly traded corporations, randomly selected from the proxy statement inventory of Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. (the Dean Witter sample). Beginning with the proxy statements which these companies had
circulated to shareholders during the 1987 proxy season, fifty-five companies (or 36.2%) disclosed that, during the fiscal year preceding the
solicitation, they had made or retained on their books at least one loan
in excess of $60,000 to one or more of their officers or directors. Seven
of these corporations were banks or financial institutions which make
loans in the ordinary course of their business, and are carefully regulated in the manner in which they are permitted to do so. 58 These banks
or financial institutions had made loans to certain of their executives
during the preceding year, which were excluded from the study. 59 With
56. The SEC requires disclosure to shareholders of material executive loans (by definition those in excess of $60.000) both in the 10-K Annual Report ( 17 C.F.R. § 249.310 ( 1987)) and
in the Annual Proxy Solicitation Schedule 14A (17 C.F.R. § 240. 14a-IOI (1987)), both of which
incorporate by reference Item 404(c) of Regulation S-K (17 C.F.R. § 229.404(c) (1987)). Among
corporations not subject to SEC oversight, only California domiciliary corporations are required
to disclose loans to their officers or directors, and even then exclusions are provided for loans of
less than $40,000 (CAL. CORP. CoDE§ 150l(b)(l) (West 1988)) and for companies with less than
100 shareholders whose by-laws waive the annual report requirement (CAL CoRP. CoDE§ 150l(a)
(West 1988)}. See generally Barnard, supra note 45, at 402-05; Brudney, supra note I 0, at 1437.
57. See Sullivan & Young, Symposium: The Proposed Michigan Business Corporation
Act: Officers and Directors. 18 WAYNE L. REv. 951, 969 (1972). The fact that managers have this
broad discretion to divert corporate assets to their own use is essentially unknown to investors.
Brudney, supra note 10, at 1416-17 ("investors believe (or assume) that management's discretion
to serve itself at their expense is considerably more limited than it actually is under prevailing legal
norms and existing ·contracts.' ... [Sltockholders expect management to work diligently and skillfully to maximize their wealth-rather than to work merely at a pace that enhances such wealth
moderately or does not diminish it-and not to divert more corporate assets to management than
the compensation expressly provided for it.").
58. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
59. Each reported that the loans were made "on substantially the same terms, including
interest rates and collateral, as those prevailing at the time for comparable transactions with other
persons, and ... in the opinion of management do not involve more than normal risk of collectability or present other unfavorable features." Alaska National Bank of the North, Proxy
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respect to the remaining forty-eight corporations, the proxy statements
revealed the following lending practices:
No. of Companies
Reporting

Intended Use of Proceeds

to purchase a home/relocation
to purchase shares in the lending corporation
to exercise a stock option granted by the lending
corporation
to purchase shares other than in the lending
corporation or otherwise invest in a business
venture
as purchase money mortgage against property
purchased from the lending corporation
for "personal reasons" (undisclosed)
other (e.g., advances toward purchases of life
insurance; to fund operating deficits of a
business venture; "in connection with the
payment of certain income tax withholding
obligations;" to defray certain personal
expenses until other funds become available
to the estate of a deceased officer)
purpose of loan not disclosed

13
8
7
4

6
6
8

15

Several aspects of this sample warrant comment. First is the
number of companies that reported having made executive loans during 1986. More than one-third of the companies circulating proxy solicitations in this sample reported having made or retained one or more
substantial loans to their executives during the preceding year. The
sample is representative, of course, not of corporations as a whole, or
even of the entire body of corporations which are subject to SEC proxy
regulations, 60 but rather of those corporations sufficiently publicly held
to circulate large numbers of proxy solicitations via the brokerage
Statement, at 9 (May 6, 1987); Heritage Financial Services, Inc., Proxy Statement, at II (May 6,
1987); John Adams Life Corp., Proxy Statement, at 6 (Apr. 30, 1987); Security Pacific Corp.,
Proxy Statement, at 46 (Apr. 28, 1987); Trustcompany Bancorporation, Proxy Statement, at 7
(May 6. 1987); Ambassador Financial Group, Inc., Proxy Statement, at 7 (May 15, 1987) (loans
made at favorable interest rates); Ameriana Savings Bank, F.S.B., Proxy Statement, at 5 (Apr. 30,
1987) (loan origination fees waived). For those entities to which federal banking law applies, these
disclaimers reflect the requirements of 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(a) (I) (1987), which strictly limits the
terms upon which loans can be made to a bank's executive officers, directors or principal
shareholders.
60. There are 12,450 such companies now registered with the SEC. DIRECTORY OF CoMPANIES REQUIRED TO FILE ANNUAL REPORTS WITH THE SEC UNDER THE SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT
OF 1934 (Sept. 30, 1986).
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houses. The lending experiences of corporations as a whole may well be
different.
A recent study by the author of forty-four companies engaging in
an initial public offering found that the percentage of such corporations
which had lent funds in material amounts to their executives in the three
years preceding going public was 43.2%. 61 It is likely that close corporations or others not anticipating a public offering even more frequently
make cash advances to their executives. 62 But even limiting the extrapolation to widely traded companies, the Dean Witter sample would
suggest that thousands of such companies each year grant substantial
loans to their executives for a variety of uses. 63
A second observation relates to the amounts involved in these
transactions. The executive loans disclosed in the Dean Witter sample
ranged from inconsequential to breathtaking in amount: ranging upward to two $2.5 million "personal loans" for otherwise undescribed
purposes, 64 but more commonly including non-cash extensions of
credit in the mid-six-figure range for the exercise of stock options and
cash loans in the low-six-figure range for relocation expenses. 65 The
amount of cash and credit tied up in executive loans by this group of
forty-eight non-bank companies totalled more than $60 million. 66
The amounts involved per corporation were in most cases probably not sufficient to have a material impact on share value 67 but, under
the SEC proxy solicitation guidelines, they were sufficient to require
disclosure to shareholders called upon to vote for the reelection of directors. 68 Moreover, the dollar amounts of some of the loans were sufficiently large, assuming noncompliance with the statutes requiring cor61. Barnard, supra note 45, at 377. These loans were made for a variety of purposes,
including share purchases, home relocation, business development (of both related and unrelated
entities), "personal" and "undisclosed." It is notable that a number of these corporations assured
investors that, effective with the success of the public offering, corporate loans to executives would
cease, or be subjected to new safeguards. See, e.g., Native Plants, Inc., S-1 No. 33-6467, at 31 (filed
June 13, 1986) ("The company intends that any future loans made by the company to officers,
directors, key employees and their affiliates will be made only for reasonable business purposes
and with the approval of a majority of the company's independent, disinterested directors.").
62. See supra notes 52-53 and accompanying text.
63. Fifty-five corporations out of the sample of 152 represents 36.2% of the reporting
corporations. Applying that percentage to the 12,450 companies now registered with the SEC
would mean that more than 4,500 such companies made executive loans in excess of$60,000 during the most recent fiscal year.
64. Carolco Pictures, Inc., Proxy Statement, at 6 (May 22, 1987).
65. See infra Appendix II.
66. /d.
67. See Eisenberg, The Modernization of Corporate Law: An Essay for Bill Cary, 37 U.
MIAMI L. REv., 187,204 (1983); Eisenberg, Shortcomings of the Arguments Against Modernizing
Corporate Law, 9 DEL. J. CORP. L. 626, 627 (1984).
68. As noted supra note 56, the materiality standard under existing federal law is
$60,000. It is, perhaps, appropriate to emphasize that, while federal securities law requires disclosure of executive loans, it does not require shareholder approval thereof. Federal banking law
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porate benefit, to generate an incentive for a shareholder derivative
challenge even in the absence of other incidents of managerial abuse.
Third, one may remark upon the interest rates charged by lending
corporations to their executive borrowers. During a period when the
prime rate averaged 8.33%, 69 corporations were extending credit to
their executives at rates ranging from 0% 70 to a 13% stated rate. 71
There is no discussion in the sampled proxy materials of the basis for
choosing an interest rate or otherwise "pricing" the loan, so it is impossible to ascertain, for example, whether a particular interest rate was
charged to reflect increased lending risk or loan processing costs,
whether it was the result of bargaining, or whether it simply represented
an arbitrary selection. There is no indication, as one would surely find
in the case of conventional lenders, of mechanisms designed to protect
these corporations from movements in interest rates over the credit cycle, such as floating interest rates, graduated rates and prepayment
penalties. 72
Some case law suggests that executive loans made at below-market
interest rates, if challenged, must result, at the least, in an upward interest rate adjustment. 73 To that extent, many of the loans reported in the
Dean Witter sample would warrant challenge. But here, unlike in the
discussion of loan principal, the amounts involved generally would not
be sufficie11t to generate shareholder invocation of liability rules.
Fourth, nearly a third of the reporting companies failed to disclose
the purpose for which the proceeds of their executive loans were intended, which one would suppose constitutes a violation of federal diseffectively requires shareholder approval of benefit plans pursuant to which loans are made to
facilitate share purchases. 12 C.F.R. § 207.5(2) (1987).
69. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, SURVEY OF CURRENT BUSINESS 5-14 (vol. 67, no. 5, May
1987).
70. See Appendix 11. It is likely following the Tax Reform Act of 1986 that executive
loans will not continue to be made at grossly below-market interest rates. See supra note 41 and
accompanying .text.
71. DiGiorgio Corp., Proxy Statement, at 6 (Apr. 27, 1987).
72. See Merris, Business Loans at Large Commercial Banks: Policies and Practice. reprinted in BANK MANAGEMENT CONCEPTS AND ISSUES 49-60 (J. Bricked. 1979).
73. Romanik v. Lurie Home Supply Center, Inc., 105 Ill. App. 3d 1118, 1133-34, 435
N.E.2d 712, 722-23 (5th Dist. 1982); see also Maxwell v. Northwest Indus., Inc., 72 Misc. 2d 814,
821, 339 N.Y.S.2d 347,356 ( 1972) (subsidiary corporation which loaned funds to its 97.2% shareholder was entitled to "at least what [the borrower] would have had to pay an outsider to borrow
the money." This was held to include not only the applicable prime rate but also the value of
compensating balances which would have been required by a bank lender, and which would have
increased the effective rate of interest.); Washington Nat'l Trust Co. v. W.M. Dary Co., 116 Ariz.
171, 174, 568 P.2d 1069, 1072 (1977) ($140,000 loan to corporation's president, repayable at 4%, is
inherently unfair to the corporation given what would have been available to it in the money
market); Hill v. Hill, 279 Pa. Super. I 54, 159,420 A.2d 1078, 1080-81 (1980) (corporate loans to
businesses wholly owned by the lending corporation's president at rates "substantially below the
rate charged unrelated businesses" constitute grounds for an accounting in favor of minority
shareholders).
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closure laws. 74 In any event, nondisclosure makes it impossible for
shareholders of those corporations to ascertain whether in fact the
loans made could reasonably be said to have provided an enterprise
benefit or to reflect the exercise of sound business judgment. Federal
disclosure law does not require a corporation to articulate the asserted
benefit arising out of an executive loan 7 s and thus does not support the
decisionmaking standards of those states which impose a benefit limitation on such loans.
Fifth, the Dean Witter sample revealed substantial uniformity in
the way in which (and purposes for which) corporations make loans,
regardless of their state of incorporation and the applicable enabling
act. 76 Conservatively, three of the forty-eight lending companies in this
sample broke the law of their incorporating states when making loans
without express and prior shareholder approval. 77
Although a given loan's characterization is not readily ascertainable merely from reading the proxy statement in which it is described, it
is fair to assume that there are two types of executive loans which are
reflected in these materials-those which are sufficiently rewarding in
their risk/return ratio that any conventional lender would make them
and those that are not.
For example, loans made to facilitate the exercise of stock options
are, by definition, desirable credits which conventional lenders would
74. See Regulation S-K, 17 C.F.R. § 229.404(c) (1987) which requires disclosure, inter
alia, of the borrower's name, "the nature of the person's relationship by reason of which such
person's indebtedness is required to be described, the largest aggregate amount of indebtedness
outstanding at any time during [the period since the beginning of the registrant's last] fiscal year,
the nature of the indebtedness and of the transaction in which it was incurred, the amount thereof
outstanding as of the latest practicable date and the rate of interest paid or charged .... "(emphasis
added.) If this provision can reasonably be interpreted to exclude a description of the purpose for
which the proceeds are to be used, then the Regulation is flawed and its purpose-"to enable
shareholders to guard against officers and directors using their authority to obtain treatment
favorable to themselves but detrimental to the corporation"-has not been wholly satisfied. SEC
No-Action Letter (Sept. 21, 1984).
75. Certainly practitioners understand that the basis for any directoral finding of corporate benefit is not a discloseable item. See Mann, Moral and Ethical Problems; Loans to Management and Compensation Problems, 31 Bus. LAW. 1305, 1306 (1976) ("There is a requirement, of
course, that you disclose loans to management in excess of$10,000; but I don't read that as saying
you disclose the rationale of the board in deciding to make the loan. There is no requirement of
such qualitative information, and in reports filed under the Exchange Act, I've not gone on behind
the requirements of the form to make the disclosure of the reason why the board has made the
loan, and other details that the ethical investor might be concerned about.").
76. See infra Appendix II.
77. Beehive International (loan to Executive Vice-President/Director, requires shareholder approval under Utah law); Gerber Energy International, Inc. (loans to officer/director,
require shareholder approval underColorado law); Tel Electronics, Inc. (loan to President/CEO,
requires shareholder approval under Utah law). The California corporations may also have violated the law by not securing shareholder approval of benefit plans or authorizing by-laws.
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welcome. 78 They are (or can be) collateralized by security of appraisable value. If the spread between the exercise price and the market
price is sufficient, any lending institution, subject to its own lending restrictions, 79 would make the loan at competitive rates. A corporation
desiring to accommodate one of its executives unable to raise the cash
exercise price 80 could use its existing banking relationships to facilitate
a loan by a conventional lender. It might guarantee the loan 81 or maintain some compensating balance in order to reduce transaction costs to
the borrower. But these loans are not made for lack of an alternative
lending market. The same situation exists where corporations make
home mortgage loans secured by the borrower's residence.
Other loans, however,.are the sort that.would not be m~de by conventional lenders, or certainly not at the interest rate charged or on the
terms offered by the corporate lender, precisely because they represent
poor credit risks. "Personal loans" to an overextended borrower, unsecured loans made to a specuiative business venture, workout loans
made to failing ventures without protective covenants and the like
would generally fall into this latter category.
In short, in an efficiently operating economic environment, business corporations are either making loans which they do not need to
make (because alternative sources of credit are available to the borrower), or they are making loans which (at least from a purely creditbased perspective) they ought not to make. Neither of these observations, however, directly addresses the statutory standard upon which
such loans should be judged: the requirement of some corporate "benefit." Some loans in either of the above categories presumably could satisfy that statutory standard, assuming its meaning were of sufficient
scope. But the meaning of "corporate benefit" in the context of execu78. Regulation G of the Federal Reserve Board,l2 C.F.R . § 2il7 (1988), provides that
corporations making loans to finance acquisition of .margin stock pursuant to a stock option,
purchase or ownership plan approved by the shareholders are limited to lending the "good faith
loan value" of the stock, 12 C.F.R. § 207.5(b), which means "the amount which a lender, exercising sound credit judgment. would lend without regard to the customer's other assets held as colla!·
eral in connection with unrelated transactions." 12 C.F.R. § 207.2(e) (1987). Loans made outside
of such plans are limited even further. 12 C.F.R . § 207.3(b) (1987).
79. See infra notes 134-37 and accompanying text.
80. See Halperin, Financing the Acquisition of Stock by Employees, 6 J . CORP. LAW 239,
240 (1980) (the common requirement that stock options be paid in cash " may impose significant
financial burdens on the executive who is often relatively 'cash poor,' with the bulk of his net worth
being in illiquid assets. in such circumstances, the executive must either substantially deplete his
liquid assets to finance the acquisition of shares or, if he is able, borrow the necessary funds .").
81. This approach was used, for example, by one of the companies in the Dean Witter
sample, Academy Insurance Group, Inc., which reported that, in connection with the execution of
an employment agreement with the executive vice-president in June 1986, the company "guaranteed for four years a loan to Mr. Cwiok from a financial institution in the amount of$500,000 the
proceeds of which Mr. Cwiok used to pay for [certain convertible notes]." Proxy Statement, at 6
(May 14, 1987).
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tive loans remains obscure, especially to the directors who must apply
that standard.
A. Giving "Benefit" Meaning

There are many ways in which the liberal grant of executive loans
intuitively might constitute a benefit to the corporation: it fosters loyalty and good will; it frees up the executive's time which otherwise
would be spent seeking financing elsewhere and therefore encourages
enhanced performance; 82 it may be necessary to maintain a corporation's competitive position in the market for manageriallabor. 83 Other
"benefits" might arise in certain lending situations: the investment may
provide the best available return to the lending corporation; granting a
purchase money mortgage may accelerate an advantageous transfer of
property.
The question is whether these represent the sort of "benefit" envisioned by the legislative drafters when they imposed a "benefit" requirement on executive loans. One must assume, given traditional notions of statutory construction, 84 that by its separate placement and its
choice of language, the "benefit" requirement for executive loans represents a concept capable of some precise articulation separate from and
more demanding than the "fairness" standard applicable to other conflict of interest transactions 85 and from the "waste" standard applicable to other compensation decisions. 86 As a matter of public policy,
what constitutes an acceptable basis for approving an executive loan?
Does the answer change according to the size and/or shareholder
makeup of the enterprise? Only two cases have directly addressed these
issues and neither has provided an adequate answer.
82. A particularly generous example of this "relief from distraction" concept appears in
the most recent proxy statement of Southmark Corporation, which discloses the establishment of
a line of credit for $8.5 million and $1.5 million, respectively, for Southmark's Chairman and ViceChairman. "The Board authorized the lines of credit so that Messrs. Phillips and Friedman would
be able to meet any loan margin calls resulting from recent declines in the market price of the
Common Stock without having to sell any of the shares of Common Stock that they own. The
Board believes that any such sales would have the effect of further depressing the market price of
the Common Stock, and could distract Messrs. Phillips and Friedman from the affairs of
Southmark. As of December 15, 1987, Southmark had advanced Messrs. Phillips and Friedman
$4,250,000 and $750,000, respectively, under the lines of credit." Proxy Statement, at 12 (Dec. 30,
1987).
83. Cf. A.P. Smith Mfg. Co. v. Barlow, 13 N.J. 145, 154, 98 A.2d 581, 586, appeal dismissed, 346 U.S. 861 (1953) (finding that corporate expenditures for charitable purposes could be
justified as "being for the benefit of the corporation; indeed, if need be the matter may be viewed
strictly in terms of actual survival of the corporation in a free enterprise system.").
84. See, e.g., R. DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 229-33
(1975) (the "plain meaning" presumption).
85. See infra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
86. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 256 1988

1988:237

Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers

257

In Oberhelman v. Barnes Investment Corp., 87 a minority shareholder brought a derivative action seeking to recover funds loaned by
Barnes Investment Corp., a bank holding company, to its majority
shareholder, president and chairman. These loans, totalling $89,912,
were unsecured and interest-free. Following the filing of the lawsuit,
Barnes shareholders (comprised of plaintiff, defendant and their wives)
met and ratified the loans over plaintiff's objection, with the defendant
casting the decisive vote.
The lower court held for the defendant, indicating that "the loans
made to Arthur M. Nease, Jr. by The Barnes Investment Corporation
are not unlawful or void transactions but are specifically authorized by
K.S.A. 17-6.303." 88 The Kansas Supreme Court reversed, noting that
throughout the period during which Barnes was making loans to its
president, the company itself had an outstanding note payable, the
principal rising to $130,000 and interest rates ranging from 6% to 19%
per annum. 89 Indeed, the court noted, "during some years funds borrowed at interest were being loaned or paid to Nease at no interest." 90
On the question of whether Barnes' loans could "reasonably be
expected to benefit the corporation," as required by Kansas law, the
Kansas court concluded, without amplification, that the answer was
"no." "[H]is purpose was not the welfare of Barnes Investment and its
other stockholders but his own personal benefit. " 91
Roxbury State Bank v. The. Clarendon 92 arose out of the sale in
November 1970 of The Clarendon Hotel in Hackettstown, New Jersey.
The transaction was effected by the sale of stock in the corporation
which owned the hotel to another corporation (Hook Mountain Industries) owned by two investors, Codella and Douglas. Hook Mountain
financed the purchase in part by taking out a $160,000 loan, secured by
a first mortgage, from the Roxbury State Bank. As Roxbury knew
when it made the loan, some $34,000 of the proceeds was used to discharge outstanding loans which had been made by Roxbury to other
corporations owned by Codella and Douglas.
When the bank sought to foreclose on the mortgage, the New
Jersey Chancery Court held the mortgage invalid to the extent of this
$34,000 and otherwise. 93 On appeal, the bank characterized the
$34,000 as a loan made by Hook Mountain to Codella and Douglas
87. 236 Kan. 335, 690 P.2d 1343 (1984).
88. /d. at 338, 690 P.2d at 1346.
89. Id. at 340, 690 P.2d at 1348.
90. /d.
91. /d.
92. 129 N.J. Super. 358, 324 A.2d 24 (App. Div. 1984).
93. /d. at 379, 324 A.2d at 27; Roxbury State Bank v. Clarendon, 123 N.J. Super. 400,
410, 303 A.2d 340, 345 (Ch. Div. 1973).
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pursuant to N.J.S.A. 14A:6-11 which provided at that time that a corporation could lend money to or guarantee any obligation of, or
"otherwise assist" any officer or other employee of the corporation
whenever any such loan, guaranty or assistance "may reasonably be
expected to benefit the corporation. " 94
The New Jersey Superior Court rejected this characterization, noting that the bank mortgage was neither a loan to nor a guaranty of any
obligation of Codella and Douglas. 95 The court added:
While it may have been intended to "assist" them, in a sense,
we find no basis for a finding that the corporation, as distinguished from Codella and Douglas personally, could reasonably be expected to benefit from the transaction. 96
These decisions, reflecting in the Clarendon case simple misappropriation and in the Oberhelman case classic oppression of a minority
shareholder, provide little guidance to the conscientious director seeking to exercise appropriate judgment when presented with a proposed
executive loan. In either case, disinterested directors performing any
genuine monitoring function would presumably not have approved the
challenged loans notwithstanding whatever collegial inclination to do
so may have existed. 97
If anything is instructive, it may be that there are only two cases
even touching on the subject, and neither one attempts to set guidelines
by which a conscientious director in the future might effectively seek to
distinguish those loans beneficial to the lending company from those
merely beneficial to the borrower. 98 Those commentators who, upon
adoption of the "benefit" standard, anticipated that it was in effect a
standardless standard, 99 may have been right.
94. 129 N.J. Super. at 377, 324 A.2d at 34.
95. /d.
96. /d.
97. See Cox & Munsinger, Bias in the Boardroom: Psychological Foundations and Legal
Implications o,(Corporate Cohesion, 48 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 83 ( 1985); Brudney, The Independent
Director-Heavenly City or Potemkin Village?, 95 HARV. L. REV. 597, 610-13; Lasker v. Burks, 567
F.2d 1208, 1212 (2d Cir. 1978), rev'don other grounds, 441 U.S. 471 (1979); Schwartz, A Case for
Federal Chartering o,( Corporations, 31 Bus. LAW. 1125, 1154 (1976).
98. Executive loan cases based on non-statutory analyses suffer the same shortcoming.
See Theodora Holding Corp. v. Henderson, 257 A.2d 398 (Del. Ch. 1969) (president/controlling
shareholder of close corporation who borrowed $110,000 in corporate funds in order to purchase a
seat on the )'lew York Stock Exchange at a time ( 1958) when Delaware law forbade such loans and
when Exchange rules prohibited corporate ownership of stock exchange seats, did so "for his own
ultimate benefit" and must therefore account to the corporation for all brokerage commissions
received by him while holding the seat, and for his profits ($330,000) in the sale of the seat).
99. See Sullivan & Young, supra note 57, at 969 ("The prerequisite standard is obviously
elastic; it is certainly doubtful that any court would challenge the determination by directors that a
loan to a particular director-officer could reasonably be expected to benefit the corporation.").
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There are, of course, alternative sources for crafting a meaning for
the term "corporate benefit." Courts have explored the concept in a
variety of non-lending contexts. For example, courts have determined
the existence of a corporate, as distinguished from an individual, benefit
in deciding whether a particular lawsuit should be brought as a derivative or direct action; 100 whether a derivative suit, once brought, should
be dismissed; 101 whether a derivative litigant at the close of the proceedings should be awarded non-statutory attorneys' fees on the
ground that he has performed "corporate therapeutics;" 102 to whom,
as between executives and their employing corporation, litigation defense costs should be allocated; 103 whether an individual has acted as
the servant or agent of an enterprise and so may subject it to tort 104 or
100. See generally AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS§ 7.01 comments and reporter's notes (Tent. Draft No.6, Oct.
10, 1986) [hereinafter ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE No. 61.
101. E.g .. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 892 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 460 U.S. 1051
( 1983) (permitting a special litigation committee to assess whether the "likely recoverable damages
discounted by the probability of a finding of liability are less than the costs to the corporation in
continuing the action .... "). See generally ALI PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE No. 6,
supra note 100, at§ 7.08 comments and reporter's notes.
102. Mills v. Electric Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375,396 (1970) (plaintiffs' demonstration
that defendant's merger proxy solicitation contained material misstatements created a non-pecuniary corporate benefit upon which an award of attorneys' fees may be premised, because it provided
an "important means of enforc[ing]" Congress' goal of "fair and informed corporate suffrage");
Bosch v. Meeker Coop. Light & Power Ass'n, 257 Minn. 362,365, 101 N.W.2d 423,427 (1960) (a
benefit sufficient to warrant an award of attorneys' fees "must be something more than technical in
its consequence and be one that accomplishes a result which corrects or prevents an abuse which
would be prejudicial to the rights and interests of the corporation .... ").
103. E.g .. Baupre v. Kingen, 109 Idaho 610, 613, 710 P.2d 520, 523 (1985) (upholds
personal liability of shareholders for defense fees incurred in a collection case in whieh the existence of their personal guarantees of the debt made the defense of the action "more realistically ...
for the benefit of" the shareholders than for the benefit of the company); Evans v. Stockton &
Hing (Matter of Southwest Restaurant Systems, Inc.), 607 F.2d. 1241 (9th Cir. 1979) (corporation's undertaking to pay legal fees for the defense of a derivative suit against two corporate officers representing 2/3 of the total share ownership is not binding on the corporation in reorganization where legal services "were solely for the individuals and did not benefit the corporation"). See
also In re Banks, 283 Or. 459, 584 P.2d 284 (1978) (en bane) (demonstrating the difficulties in
distinguishing between work done for a close corporation and work done for its dominating
shareholder).
104. E.g .. Thurston Metal & Supply Co. v. Taylor, 230 Va. 475, 339 S.E.2d 538 (1986)
(plaintiff injured at a company golf outing by club thrown by corporate president may recover
against corporation because the weekend, planned for suppliers and customers, was intended to
benefit the corporation); see also Gerger v. Campbell, 98 Wis. 2d 282, 297 N.W.2d 183 (1980)
(president of close corporation who altered safety features on corporate equipment which later
severely injured an employee, is immunized from personal tort liability, because he was acting in
his supervisory capacity, and not in any personal capacity); Phillips v. Montana Educ. Ass'n, 187
Mont. 419, 610 P.2d 154 ( 1980) (corporate officers are shielded from liability for tortious interference with contract so long as their conduct is not for personal pecuniary gain but rather in the
furtherance of corporate interests); but see Olympic Fish Prods. Inc. v. Lloyd, 93 Wash. 2d 596,
602, 611 P.2d 737, 740 (1980) (director/manager of close corporation may not be immunized from
personal liability in an action for tortious interference with contract, where court could reasonably
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criminal 105 liability; whether a corporate employee is subject to personal jurisdiction based upon contacts arising solely out of his employment activities or whether he is protected by a "fiduciary shield"; 106
whether a given corporate expenditure is proper or an improper
"gift"; 107 whether a corporate expenditure by a regulated utility is
properly charged to the shareholders or to ratepayers; 108 whether
shareholder payments on behalf of a corporation should be tax deductible, 109 and whether executive conduct constitutes usurpation of a corfind that his conduct was "solely for his own benefit rather than in the best interests of (his
company)").
For a similar analysis in a contractual setting, see Martin Roofing, Inc., v. Goldstein, 60
N.Y.2d 262,267,457 N.E.2d 700,702,469 N.Y.S.2d 595,597 (1983) (oral promises of payment
made by corporation's president to a supplier do not result in his personal liability, because fact
that supplier then returned to work benefits the corporation rather than the officer who, as a
minority shareholder, only benefited indirectly).
105. E.g., United States v. Cattle King Packing Co., 793 F.2d 232, 241 (lOth Cir.), cert.
denied sub nom. Stanko v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 573 (1986) (meat packing company held criminally liable for violations of the Federal Meat Inspection Act by its operating manager, because
those actions economically benefited the corporate defendant); United States v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc .. 770 F.2d 399,406-07 (4th Cir. 1985) (corporation's conviction for falsifying
documents to a federal agency is upheld where the culpable person-an employee of defendant's
wholly owned subsidiary-could have intended to provide benefit to defendant by ensuring "lack
of difficulties with the FDA," even though his conduct also was intended to ensure his own
advancement).
106. E.g., Marine Midland Bank v. Miller, 664 F.2d 899,902-04 (2d Cir. 1981) (corporate
executive who made false representations to a bank in order to secure a corporate loan may not be
protected by the fiduciary shield where the corporation was a mere shell and his actions, ostensibly
for the benefit of the corporation, were really for his own benefit); see also Note, Personal Jurisdiction and the Corporate Employee: Minimum Contacts Meet the Fiduciary Shield, 38 STAN. L. REV.
813 (1986); Sponsler, Jurisdiction Over the Corporate Agent: The Fiduciary Shield, 35 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 349 (1978); Note, The Fiduciary Shield Doctrine: Minimum Contacts in Special Context, 65
B.U.L. REV. 967 (1985).
107. E.g., Aranolfv. Albanese, 85 A.D.2d 3, 446 N.Y.S.2d 369 (1982) (shareholders' allegations that corporate purchase of equipment was beneficial to tenant but not to the lessor corporation and therefore was improper as a gift withstands defendants' motion for summary
judgment).
108. E.g., In re Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of W.Va., 22 Pub. Uti!. Rep. 4th 197
(1977) ("While it is true that [charitable) contributions to local service areas do benefit the communities served, they also tend to upgrade the company's public image and therefore work more to
the benefit of the utility and its stockholders than to the benefit of the subscribers."). For a discussion of the appropriate allocation of charitable contributions as between ratepayers and stockholders, see City of Cincinnati v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 55 Ohio St. 2d 168, 177-82, 378 N.E.2d
729, 735-37 (1978) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 912 (1979). For a commentary on
the recasting of charitable gestures into instruments for profitability, see Berle, Modern Functions
of the Corporate System, 62 CoLUM. L. REv. 433,444 (1962) (corporate officers "apply the potential profits or public relations tests later on, a sort of left-handed justification in this curious freemarket world where an obviously moral or decent or humane action has to be apologized for on
the ground that, conceivably, you may somehow make money by it.").
109. E.g., Betson v. Commissioner, 802 F.2d 365, 368 (9th Cir. 1986) (physician's advances of funds on behalf of liquor store venture in which he and his wife were the sole shareholders were primarily intended to benefit the corporation rather than the taxpayer and therefore are
not deductible against his personal income; the benefit was "to provide operating capital and
perpetuate or revitalize the liquor operations carried on by" the corporation).
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porate opportunity.U 0 The inquiry in each of these contexts may be
cast in precisely the same terms as the inquiry applicable under the executive lending statutes: whether an actor's conduct benefited, or was reasonably intended to benefit, the corporation or whether in fact it benefited, or was intended to benefit, solely the actor. Accordingly, the
courts' identification of corporate benefits in these non-loan cases suggests parameters by which one can judge the existence of a corporate
benefit in executive lending situations.
According to these non-loan cases, a corporation is "benefited"
when (1) its share value is increased; (2) the market share of its products
is increased; (3) its association with valued suppliers and/or customers
is strengthened; (4) its productivity is improved; or (5) its "public image" is polished.
A corporation is not benefited when (1) considering all intangible
as well as out-of-pocket expenses the cost to the corporation of its action exceeds whatever benefits it has received; or (2) the net benefit is
infinitesimal.
As an initial proposition, directors ought not to authorize loans
which do not lead to one of the "beneficial" consequences found in
these cases. 111 This proposition may argue too much, given the possibility that other potential benefits may be identified, but these guidelines provide a sound starting position. Absent the special considerations discussed in the following sections of this Article, the foregoing
enumeration of corporate benefits ought to form the benchmark from
which all executive lending decisions are made.
B. Executive Loans as an Element of Compensation

One may divide executive loans into two categories, based upon
the lender's general purpose in making the loans. First are those loans
made as a compensation substitute or, more accurately, a "compensation adjunct." Corporations making loans in this category lend credit
to enable executives to purchase homes or stock, or pay personal bills,
for example, rather than raising their salary in order to enable them to
110. See generally Brudney & Clark, A New Look at Corporate Opportunities, 94 HARV.
L. REv. 997 (1981). The question in corporate opportunity cases is posed in terms of the existence
or nonexistence of a corporate "asset" rather than of a corporate "benefit," but the problem is
clearly analogous to that posed in the loan cases.
Ill. Loans which might satisfy the benefit standards articulated in the non-loan cases
would include loans made to support a supplier whose expansion is necessary to provide the corporation with necessary materials; loans made to permit acquisition of property leasable by the
corporation in order to facilitate production or distribution; loans made to enable an advertising
agency to acquire state-of-the-art production equipment in order to prepare effective corporate
advertisements.
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do so on their own. 112 Second are those loans made in connection with
and in order to facilitate some transaction in which both the corporation and the executive are parties. These loans can be considered
"transaction adjuncts."
Many directors would argue that the appropriate test for executive
loans in the first category should be the test applied to other compensation decisions: whether the intended recipient of the loan is likely to
"repay" its value by enhanced loyalty and performance.U 3 Certainly
from the executive's point of view, this would be the most favorable
characterization of executive loans. Traditionally, executive compensation arrangements are virtually unassailable in the absence of a showing
that they constitute waste. 114 Short of abuse at that level, regardless of
their generosity, compensation schemes are assumed to serve a valid
business purpose and hence generally resist shareholder challenge. 115
But characterizing as mere components of a total executive compensation package those executive loans intended to serve as a compensation adjunct, although it undoubtedly would simplify the inquiry,
would be an inappropriate reading of the loan enabling statutes. If the
legislature intended executive loans to be treated as matters of compensation, presumably the enabling provision would have been stated more
broadly or indeed combined with other provisions relating to compensation.U6 Rather, loan enabling statutes in every state stand separate
from compensation provisions, and articulate a specific standard for
112. Professors Brudney and Clark have suggested that compensation adjuncts are inappropriate, at least in the context of publicly held corporations. "There is no need for covert additions to the officers' compensation either to induce them to contribute their best efforts to the firm
or to treat them fairly." Brudney & Clark, supra note 110, at 1023.
113. See Beard v. Elster, 39 Del. Ch. 153, 163, 160 A.2d 731, 737 (Del. 1960) ("All stock
option plans must be tested against the requirement that they contain conditions, or that surrounding circumstances are such, that the corporation may reasonably expect to receive the contemplated benefit from the grant of the options."). This concept was perhaps taken to an extreme
in Freedman v. Barrow, 427 F. Supp. 1129 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), when the court approved the extension by Exxon of substantial benefits to its executives (including some already retired), opining:
"Exxon receives a benefit ... because the next chief executive officer is likely to work that much
harder believing and trusting that when his retirement is imminent, the granting committees will, if
necessary, deal with him in equal fairness .... " /d. at 1156.
))4. See cases collected in D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S. RADIN, THE BUSINESS JUDGMENT
RULE: FIDUCIARY DUTIES OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS AND OFFICERS 59-62 (1986); AMERICAN LAW
INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS§ 5.03 reporter's comment 3 (Tent. Draft No. 5, Apr. )5, 1986) [hereinafter ALJ PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE No. 5J.
115. See, e.g., discussion of golden parachute arrangements in D. BLOCK, N. BARTON & S.
RADIN, supra note 114, at 170-78; Note, Golden Parachutes, Untangling the Ripcords, 39 STAN. L.
REV. 955, 962, 964-66 (1987).
116. See, e.g., REVISED MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT§ 8.11 ("the board of directors may fix
the compensation of directors"); that provision is understood to be governed by REVISED MODEL
BusiNESS CORP. AcT§ 8.30(a) ("A director shall discharge his duties as a director ... in good faith;
with the care an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would exercise under similar circumstances; and in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the corporation.").
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approval not found in those provisions. By the plain expression embodied in its terms, the statutory "benefit" requirement surely must mean
something more than the absence of waste. 117
Nonetheless some loans i:nade as compensation adjuncts should be
judged by a more liberal standard than others. Many loans made as
compensation adjuncts advance legitimate and specific corporate purposes. Home relocation loans, if made at reasonable rates and security,
easily fit this category, as do home repurchase agreements, another
compensation adjunct. An employee will be more willing to accept a
company-directed transfer knowing that the disruptions inherent in
finding and purchasing a new home and disposing of the old one will be
eased. Loans made to facilitate the purchase of stock, or payment of
personal financial obligations, college expenses or income taxes, on the
other hand, do not advance specific corporate purposes. 118
In short, treating executive loans simply as another form of compensation, as most directors apparently do, invokes too broad a standard of discretion and review. Directors contemplating approval of a
loan made as a compensation adjunct must further articulate the specific corporate purpose sought to be advanced by the loan. Some generalized notion of "performance incentive" ought not to be sufficient.
C. Loans Made To Facilitate Transactions
Executive loans made in connection with a corporate transaction,
such as the sale of corporate property or the purchase of services from a
director's independent business venture, present different analytical
problems than loans made solely as compensation adjuncts. These
loans are adjuncts for conflict of interest transactions, a historically dis117. Some compensation experts would suggest that executive loans may necessarily generate a corporate benefit by enhancing performance. Some recent studies have suggested, for example, that "the pay and performance of top executives are strongly and positively related." M urphy, Top Executives Are Worth Every Nickel They Get, 64 HARV. Bus. REv .• Mar.-Apr. 1986, at
I 25 . That is, as the rate of increase in executive compensation rises, so does the rate of increase in
the corporation's return on investment. /d. at 126 exhibit I. Unfortunately these findings do not
indicate the causal relationship between the variables. That is, it is equally plausible that compensation rises over time because corporate performance has improved as it is that corporate performance has improved because compensation has risen. Some studies have suggested that corporate
performance (as measured by stock price) increases merely because a company adopts a performance-based compensation plan, without regard to any managerial actions subsequently taken.
Tehranian & Waegelein, Market Reaction to Short-Term Executive Compensation Plan Adoption, 7
J. AccT. & EcoN. 131 (1985); Brickley, Bhagat & Lease, The Impact of Long-Range Managerial
Compensation Plans on Shareholder Wealth, 7 J. AccT. & EcoN. I 15 (1985).
Moreover, other studies have shown quite different results, including findings that "performance correlates weakly with pay" and that it correlates "not at all." Loomis, The Madness of
Executive Compensation, FORTUNE, July 12, 1982, at 42, 44.
I I 8. On the subject ofloans made to facilitate share purchases, see i'!fra notes I 27-30 and
accompanying text.
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favored species. 119 Accordingly, they must be subjected to stricter scrutiny than loans made as compensation adjuncts and the standard for
finding some corporate benefit attendant to such loans must be higher.
Conflict of interest transactions, whether under state safe harbor
statutes 120 or common law, 121 are subject to a "fairness" or "arm's
length" standard of approval and review. This standard was articulated
in its most-quoted form by the U.S. Supreme Court in Pepper v.
Litton: 122
[T]he burden is on the director ... not only to prove the good
faith of the transaction but also to show its inherent fairness
from the viewpoint of the corporation and those interested
therein .... The essence of the test is whether or not under all
the circumstances the transaction carries the earmarks of an
arm's length bargain. 123
Application of the arm's length standard to executive loans may be
inappropriate for several reasons. Initially, there is the semantic distinction between a transaction which is merely "fair" to a corporation and
one which is affirmatively "beneficial." 124 More significant is the lack in
119. Marsh, supra note 29, at 36-43.
120. See, e.g., ALA. CODE§ I0-2A-63 (1975); ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 10-041 (1956); CAL.
CORP. CoriE § 310 (West 1977); CoLO. REv. STAT.§ 7-5-114.5 (1986); CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 33323 (West 1987); DEL. CooE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1974); FLA. STAT. ANN.§ 607.124 (West 1977); GA.
CODE ANN.§ 14-2-155 (1982); HAW. REV. STAT.§ 415-41 (1985); IDAHO CODE§ 30-1-41 (1980 &
Supp. 1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, para. 8.60 (Smith-Hurd 1985); IND. CODE ANN.§ 23-1-35-2
(Burns 1986); IOWA CODE ANN.§ 496A.34 (West 1986); KANSAS STAT. ANN.§ 17-6304 (1981); KY.
REv. STAT. ANN.§ 271A.205 (MichiejBobbs-Merrill 1981); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 12:84 (West
1983); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 13-A, § 717 (1964); Mo. CoRPS. & AssN's CODE ANN.§ 2-419
(1985); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 450.2545 (West 1986); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 302A.255 (West
1985); MONT. CODE ANN.§ 78.140 (Michie 1986); NEB. REV. STAT.§ 21-2040.01 (1943); NEV. REV.
STAT. ANN.§ 78.140 (Michie 1986); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 293-A:41 (1986); N.J. STAT. ANN.§
14A:6-8 (West 1986); N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW§ 713 (McKinney 1986); N.C. GEN. STAT.§ 55-30
(1982); N.D. CENT. CooE § 10-19.1-51 (1985); OHIO REv. CODE ANN.§ 1701.60 (Anderson 1985);
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 1030 (West 1986); OR. Bus. CoRP. AcT§ 86 (1983); R.I. GEN. LAws§
7.1.1-37.1 (1985); S.C. CODE ANN.§ 33-13-160 (Law. Co-op 1987); TENN. CODE ANN.§ 48-1-816
(1984); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. II,§ 1888 (1984); VA. CODE ANN.§ 13.1-691 (1985); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN.§ 23A.08.435 (West Supp. 1987); W. VA. CODE§ 31-1-25 (1982); WIS. STAT.§ 180.355 (19851986); WYO. STAT.§ 17-1-136.1 (1986).
121. See generally Note, When Must a Transaction Between a Corporation and Its Directors be Fair and Reasonable? An Analysis of Conflict of Interest Statutes, II WM. MITCHELL L. REV.
199, 217-24 (1985); Note, Section 21-2040.01: Interested Director Transactions and Considerations
of Fairness, 58 NEB. L. REV. 909,920-22 (1979); Bulbulia and Pinto, Statutory Responses to Interested Directors' Transactions: A Watering Down of Fiduciary Standards?, 53 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
20 I, 224 (1977).
122. 308 u.s. 295 (1939).
123. Id. at 306-07.
124. This may well be an unduly precious distinction. Current notions of "fairness" encompass notions of "benefit." See ALl PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE No. 5, supra note
114, § 5.02(a)(2)(A) comment ("In determining whether to enter into a transaction, the corporate
decision maker who approves the transaction should consider not only whether the transaction will
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many conflict of interest transactions of appropriate referents. The
arm's length formulation assumes that the board (or a reviewing court)
is able to ~valuate the transaction in question by reference to comparable transactions, which is not always possible 125 or appropriate. Employing this approach in the case of an executive loan would require
directors to consider (1) whether tlie corporation would make the loan
if the borrower were someone other than a manager or (2) whether
some independent lender would make the loan to the manager on comparable terms.
Both of the necessary referents may exist where a corporation contemplates granting a purchase money mortgage to a corporate executive acquiring corporate property. 126 Neither may exist where the purpose of the loan is to facilitate the bail-out of a manager's failing
business. Where the proffered loan represents an investment in a separate business venture owned or controlled by the corporate executive,
the banking referent is inappropriate because it does not take into account the costs of the executive's divided loyalty and possible misappropriation of corporate opportunity, nor does it recognize the substantially higher costs to a corporation not otherwise in the lending
business of maintaining, keeping records for and collecting loan accounts. Even where the loan involves the sale of corporate property, the
banking referent fails to account for the value of forgone cash which
would have been available to the corporation had a conventional lender
provided purchase financing. Simple numerical comparisons of comparable undertakings, assuming they are possible, can be misleading and
can easily mask preferential treatment of executives which provides no
independent benefit to the corporation.
Executive loans made as transaction adjuncts should be thought of
as involving two analytical steps: first, the transaction itself must be
evaluated on fairness grounds (for example, is the purchase price for the
corporate property being sold adequate and is sale of the property beneficial to the corporation?), and second, the facilitating loan must be
independently evaluated to see if it provides some incremental, addibe fair to the corporation as measured by comparison with an arm's length transaction with an
unrelated third party, but whether the transaction affirmatively will be in the corporation's best
interest, as in a transaction with an unrelated party. For example, the purchase of a parcel of
property by the corporation from a director may be at a fair price, but the corporate decisionmaker should also determine that it is beneficial to the corporation to acquire the property for
its business."). This has been referred to as a "two-tier standard of fairness." Note, Interested
Director Transactions and Considerations of Fairness, supra note 121, at 909.
. · 125. Cf. Note, When Must a Transaction Between a Corporation and Its Directors be Fair
and Reasonable?, supra note 121 at 220-21.
126. Use of the "in-house" referent should be limited to cases in which there have actually
been comparable arm's length transactions involving corporate loans to third parties. Hypothetical referents present a risk of legerdemain which can only exacerbate, and not solve, the problems
presented by the ambiguity of the benefit standard.
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tional benefit (for instance, appreciable acceleration of the closing or
creation of a tax savings).
D. Loans Made to Facilitate Share Purchases

Whether one starts from an enumeration of court-recognized corporate benefits, or analogizes to comparable non-loan transactions, the
preceding discussion does not accorruriodate executive loans made to
facilitate the purchase of shares or the exercise· of a stock option-collectively the most frequent justification in the Dean Witter sample for
making an executive loan. These loans cannot be said to advance a specific, articulable corporate purpose (as is necessary in the case of compensation adjuncts) nor do they facilitate necessary corporate transactions (as in the case of transaction adjuncts). And yet they proliferate
and presumably are thought to provide some benefit.
Many theoreticians have suggested that a business enterprise receives a substantial benefit when its managers are also substantial
equity owners, so that share ownership should be encouraged. A 1975
study indicated that "an increase in average [managerial] stockholdings
from $100,000 to $1 million raises the firm's rate of return by 1.7 percent with a further increase of 0.5 percent if stockholdings rise to $2
million." 127 A more recent study suggests that the value of a corporation rises when it adopts a compensation plan which increases managers' ownership interests. 128 In addition, there is some suggestion that
significant managerial stock ownership may provide an important
means of tempering the "agency problem." 129 If one accepts these
premises, then executive loans made for the purpose of facilitating
share purchases or the exercise of stock options satisfy the statutory
"benefit" requirement. 130
127. Stano, Executive Ownership Interests and Corporate Performance, 42 S. EcoN. J. 27278 (1975). quoted in R. POSNER & K. Scorr, ECONOMICS OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES
REGULATION 38 (1980).
128. Brickley, Bhagat & Lease, supra note 117, at 126. Other studies have refined this
discussion of the relationship between managerial share ownership and corporate performance.
See. e.g., Flath & Knoeber, Managerial Shareholding, 34 J. INDUS. EcoN. 93 (1985). Ironically,
corporate managers themselves have argued, in response to shareholder proposals that outside
directors maintain some minimum shareholdings, that "an individual's contributions to the business's success have no relation to the number of shares held .... " Muckley, Dear Fellow Shareowner, HARV. Bus. REv., Mar.-Apr. 1984, at 46, 58.
129. Bcnston, The Self Serving Management Hypothesis-Some Evidence, 7 J. AccT. &
EcoN. 67, 82 (1985).
130. On the other hand, one wonders whether, if the aim is to increase share ownership, a
generous stock option plan really requires the additional incentive of a facilitating loan. Where the
option has substantial value, it is doubtful that many corporate managers would forgo their right
to exercise it rather than arrange their own alternative financing. Moreover, one intuitively suspects that the existence of the option provides just as strong an incentive to increase share value as
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E. Thinking About Risk

Only a handful of the corporations in the Dean Witter sample
which disclosed the making of executive loans made any reference to
security against the possibility of default. 131 This is due, in part, to the
limitations of SEC disclosure requirements 132 but also reflects a fundamental shortcoming in the statutory authorization pursuant to which
the loans were made, and a recurring flaw in the way in which directors
make executive lending decisions.
The executive loan enabling statutes, by focusing solely on the putative benefits of such loans, have failed to consider, and failed to require that corporate executives consider, the countervailing risks involved in making loans. These risks traditionally include, inter alia,
borrower illiquidity, inadequate collateralization, inclination to default, and volatility of the economy. These factors collectively make up
the "Three C's of Credit" in the lending industry. 133 Financial institutions whose business it is to make loans tend to insulate themselves
against these risks. Indeed, national banks are statutorily precluded
from engaging in precisely the sorts of loans stimulated by the corporate executive loan enabling acts. Banks are subject to per person lending limits. 134 They are restricted in the amount of funds they can lend
does actual ownership of the shares. So the costs to the corporation of making and overseeing the
loan may exceed the marginal benefit of having done so.
131. Air Express lnt'l Corp., Proxy Staiement, at 9 (May 15, 1987) (loan secured by
shares purchased); Avalon Corp., Proxy Statement, at II (May 14, 1987) (loan secured by second
mortgage on borrower's resid!:nce); Carolco Pictures, Inc., Proxy Statement, at 6 (May 22, 1987)
(loans secured by borrowers' personal residence); Fluorocarbon Co., Proxy Statement, at 4 (May
5, 1987) (loans secured by trust deeds on the borrowers' residences); Gemcraft, Inc., Proxy Statement, at 15 (May 26, 1987) (loan to joint venture of which the company's Chairman and CEO was
a partner personally guaranteed by him); Gerber Energy lnt'l, Inc., Proxy Statement, at II (May
22, 1987) (loan secured by Stock); Michaels Stores, Inc., Proxy Statement, at 12 (May 20, 1987)
(loan secured by stock); Pratt'Hotel Corp., Proxy Statement, at II (May 4, 1987) (loan secured by
a first mortgage on the borrower's residence); Ross Stores, Inc., Proxy Statement, at 19 (May 14,
1987) (loan ~ecured by a deed of trust on the borrower's home).
One court has suggested in dictum that any unsecured loan to a corporate executive ought
to be considered "unfair" as a matter of law. Washington Nat'l Trust Co. v. W.M. Dary Co., 116
Ariz. 171, 174-75,568 P.2d 1069, 1072-73 (1977).
132. See supra notes 56 and 74.
133. They are Character, Capacity and Capital. Bryan, The Banker and The Credit Decision, in BANK CREDIT 2 (H. Prochnow ed. 1981).
134. 12 U.S.C. § 84 (Supp. 1987). See Glidden, National Bank Lending Limits and the
Comptroller's Regs: A Clarification, 101 BANKING L. J. 430 (1984); Glidden, National Bank Lending Limits: Interpretive Issues and Practical Considerations, 101 BANKING L. J. 554 (1984). The
historical origins of federal bank lending limits are unclear, but apparently one of the reasons for
adoption of institutional limits when the national banking system was established in 1863 was the
need to diversify risk. Glidden, A Clarification, supra, at 432. One court has opined that the lending
limit was "[a] rule laid down from experience to regulate [the bank's]loans for its own best interest
and those of its stockholders and creditors, not a rule to regulate its customers .... The intention
[was] to protect the association and its stockholders and creditors from unwise banking .... "
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to enterprises controlled by the same persons who control the bank. 135
They are specifically limited in the amount of money they can lend (or
credit they can extend) personally to their own officers, directors and
principal shareholders, and strictly confined with respect to the terms
upon which they may do so. 136 National banking associations cannot
make loans secured by their own stock. 137 Surely these provisions and
the prophylactic purposes which they serve suggest that similar restric-.
tions might be appropriate in cases in which non-bank lenders with no
expertise in lending have been authorized to make loans.
It is true that limitations on executive lending similar to those imposed on banks can be built into a corporation's articles or by-laws. 138
And directors contemplating approval of an executive loan are always
well-advised to give careful thought to traditional credit
considerations. 139
O'Hare v. Second Nat'l Bank, 77 Pa. 96, 102-03 (1874), quoted in Valente v. Dennis, 437 F.·Supp.
783, 786 (E.D. Pa. 1977).
135. 12 U.S.C. § 37lc (Supp. 1987); 12 C.F.R. § 215 (1987). These enterprises may include
corporations "controlled" by the bank executives, 12 C.F.R. § 215.2(k) (1987), and partnerships
in which the bank executives are partners, 12 C.F.R. § 215.5 (1987). '
136. 12 U.S.C. § § 375a (1978 & Supp. 1987), 375b (Supp. 1987); 12 C.F.R. § 215 (1987).
See Annotation, Construction and Application of Statutes Prohibiting or Limiting Loans to Bank's
Officers or Directors, 49 A.L.R. 3d 727 (1973). Significant loans to bank executives must be approved in advance by the disinterested members of the bank's board, 12 C.F.R. § 215.4(b) (l)(i)
(1987), and information about many executive loans must be disclosed in regulatory reports, 12
C.F.R. § 215.9 (1987), or upon request from the public, 12 C.F.R. § 215.10 (1987).
137. 12 u.s.c. § 83 (1987).
138. Scott, supra note 35, at 292 ("Where special circumstances require, as in the protection of minority interests, an appropriate limitation in the articles of incorporation or in the bylaws can accomplish the objective.").
139. An example of a carefully crafted loan policy was reflected in the most recent proxy
statement of The Wholesale Club, Inc. In its disclosure of various compensation plans, the company described its Employee Loan Program, adopted by the board in 1985, for the purpose of
facilitating the exereise of stock options. Under this plan:
(T]he loans may be made for a term not to exceed 36 months and at a rate of
interest not less than the prime lending rate established from time to time by the Indiana
National Bank.
No advancement or loan may be made to an employee under the Loan Program
for the purpose of exercising any option under the Company's Executive Incentive Stock
Option Plan. Moreover, any advancement or loan to an employee under the Loan Program for the purpose of exercising any option under the Company's Incentive Stock
Option Plan must bear interest at a rate at least equal to the rate established by the
Internal Revenue Service and then in effect under applicable federal income tax laws.
The Loan Program imposes additional restrictions on lending to officers and Directors. No loan may be made if the total outstanding balance of all loans exceeds 5% of
the market value of the outstanding shares of the Company. Other than this limit on the
maximum aggregate outstanding balance of all loans made by the Company, there is no
ceiling amount that can be lent to any individual officer or Director, or to all officers and
Directors as a group. In addition, the Company may not deliver a stock certificate to the
purchaser until any corresponding loan has been repaid in full.
Proxy Statement, at 8 (statement for meeting on June 9, 1987).
Another example appears in the Baxter Travenol Proxy Statement:
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But considerations of risk seem to have eluded the loan-making
directors in many companies represented in the Dean Witter sample.
This may prove especially unfortunate in the event of an economic reversal. Even with the statutory limitations imposed on banks, they have
in recent months experienced substantial losses as a result of making
injudicious executive loans, as have thrifts and credit unions which are
less well-regulated. Just a glance at the recent well-publicized institutional closures or receiverships at Vernon Savings & Loan in Texas/ 40
Old Court Savings & Loan and Merritt Commercial Savings & Loan in
Maryland, 141 United American Bank in Tennessee, 142 Commonwealth
Savings in Nebraska, 143 FirstSouth FSB in Arkansas, 144 Penn Square
Bank in Oklahoma 145 and the Alaska Teamsters Federal Credit Union
in Alaska, 146 all of which have been attributed in substantial part to the
presence of excessive insider loans, helps one fully appreciate the degree
to which freewheeling executive lending practices can bring ruin to the
interests of shareholders and creditors.
The relationship between excessive insider loans and business failure is more than anecdotal. A recent study of 1,000 banks has indicated
that excessive insider loans are a "major warning sign that a bank may
eventually fail." 147 All of this suggests that directors approaching the
In February, I 985, the board of directors authorized the Company to loan funds
to the Company's executive officers. The amount loaned to any executive could not exceed the executive's base salary for I 985. Authority to make the loans expired at May I,
1985. Loans are repayable on demand by the Company (but not later than February,
I988) and bear interest at a rate determined at the end of each calendar quarter, equal to
the rate on the Company's 30-day commercial paper.
Proxy Statement, at I 3 (Mar. 27, I 987).
140. Texas S & L Disasters are Blamed, in Part, on Freewheeling Style, Wall St. J., July 13,
1987, at I, col. 6.
141. See FourS & L Officials Indicted in Insider Loan Probe: $45 Million Scheme at Merritt Alleged, Wash. Post, Mar. 26, 1987, at BJ, col. 5.
142. Butcher Scandal Snares Another, AM. BANKER, June 8, 1987, at 20.
143. On Trial-Impeachment in Nebraska: An AG in Court-as Defendant, NAT'L. L.J.
Apr. 23, I984, at 6.
144. See Boom to Bust in Arkansas, Wash. Post, Aug. 30, I987, at HI, H6 ("Hundreds of
millions of dollars worth of insider loans were in default when the institution failed. FirstSouth's
biggest stockholders became its biggest debtors.").
145. P. ZWEIG, BELLY UP: THE COLLAPSE OF THE PENN SQUARE BANK 83, 187, 196,265-66,
412 (1985); M. SINGER, FUNNY MONEY 105-06, I 10, 192 (1985).
146. Regulator Charges Fraud in Suit Against Ex-Head of Alaska Credit Union, AM.
BANKER, June I I, 1987, at 18, col. 4.
147. Study Shows Insider Loans May Signal Failure, AM. BANKER, July 9, I 987, at 3, col.
2. This study did not find that excessive insider loans are the direct cause of bank failures, but
rather that the management style which permits the liberal extension of credit to bank executives
also may encourage poor business practices elsewhere. Lawrence, Kummer & Arshadi, Inside Borrowing Practices of Commercial Banks, I I IssuES BANK REG. 28 (I 987). Statistics developed by the
authors indicate that "high insider borrowing banks" have higher Joan losses, larger operating
expenses, greater risk, lower returns on equity and a greater failure rate than "low or medium
borrowing banks." D. Kummer, N. Arshadi, & E. Lawrence, Valuation Consequences of Bank
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question of whether to authorize an executive loan ought to do so with
a presumption against authorization, absent a compelling corporate interest to the contrary.
IV.

RETHINKING THE ENABLING ACTS

A. Differential Treatment of Inside and Outside Directors

The states have made various attempts to balance the perceived
need to make loans available to corporate executives against the need to
protect shareholders and creditors from managerial opportunism.
Some of the solutions reflect contradictory impulses 148 and others a
surprising willingness to defer financial decisionmaking authority to
shareholders. 149
Only two state enabling statutes reflect in simple terms the goals
initially sought by such statutes: authorization for a corporation to
make advances of business-related expenses to officer/directors who
under traditional trust principles would arguably have been disabled
from receiving this routine employee benefit. 150 The states which retain
the 1969 MBCA format 151 presumably intended a similar result by authorizing loans to directors who are also employees, but not permitting
loans to be made to outside directors absent express shareholder apInsider Borrowing 20 (working paper on file at Wisconsin Law Review). They conclude that "insider abuses have contributed to at least one-third of all [bank] failure cases." /d.
Banks are not the only entities where insider borrowing presages failure. It is not uncommon for businesses of many sorts when seeking protection under Chapter II or liquidating under
Chapter 7 of the Bankruptcy Act to disclose in their required filings that they have permitted
insider "withdrawals" in the year preceding the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings. See II
U.S.C. Form 8, § 19(b) (Supp. IV 1986) ("If the debtor is a partnership or corporation, what
withdrawals, in any form (including compensation, bonuses, or loans) have been made or received
by any member of the partnership, or by any officer, director, insider, managing executive, or
shareholder of the corporation, during the year immediately preceding the filing of the original
petition herein?").
148. Compare Mo. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 351.165 (Vernon Supp. 1988) (corporation not
permitted to make loans to any shareholder to facilitate the purchase of shares) with IND. CoDE
ANN.§ 23-1-2-18 (Burns 1984) (repealed effective Aug. I, 1987) (loans available only to facilitate
the purchase of shares).
149. See supra note 6 and accompanying text; see also infra Appendix I.
150. In addition to their "benefit" statutes setting standards for board approval of executive loans. Minnesota and North Dakota also have very practical statutes authorizing routine
loans without the necessity of board approval. MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 302A.505 (West 1985): N.D.
CENT. CoDE§ 10-19.1-90 (1985) ("A corporation may, without a vote of the directors, advance
money to its directors, officers or employees to cover expenses that can reasonably be anticipated
to be incurred by them in the performance of their duties and for which they would be entitled to
reimbursement in the absence of an advance."). Presumably many corporations in other states
make these advances without directoral approval and without recognizing that they are, in a strict
sense, illegal loans.
151. See supra note 36. These states include Alabama. Arizona, Idaho, Iowa. Kentucky,
Montana, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, South Dakota, West Virginia and Wyoming.
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proval. Even the Delaware General Corporation Law focuses on loans
to "officer[s] or other employee[s]," excluding from its liberal coverage
outside directors. 152
This discrimination against outside directors may appear innocuous, if one assumes loans are made only for business-related expenses,
but in fact it is problematical where loans are made (as is common) for
nonbusiness-related purposes. If a contemplated loan is beneficial to
the lending corporation, then why should the state by requiring proxy
solicitation (as is the case of those states r~taining the 1969 MBCA format) impose a substantially higher transaction cost solely because of
the borrower's role in the enterprise? 153 Moreover, if as a regulatory
gesture a higher transaction cost is to be imposed, it would seem more
reasonably applicable to loans made to inside directors (who, because
of their access to information concerning opportunities to do so, are
more likely to abuse their relationship with the corporation and whose
opportunity for self-reward in the absence of disclosure to shareholders
is essentially undetectable) 154 than those made to outside directors
(who are assumed to be "independent" of management). 155 A better
formula, and that adopt!!d in the Revised.Model Business Corporation
Act, 156 would delete any distinctio~ between directors who are and
those who are not officers or employees.
152. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 143 (1983). The Delaware format is shared by Florida,
Kansas, Maryland, Michigan and Oklahoma.
California's statute also stresses the borrowing needs of inside directors. Although requiring
generally that executive loans be authorized by the shareholders, California permits those corporations with 100 or more shareholders, which have adopted an appropriate by-law, to make loans
to officers, whether or not they are also directors, by board approvaL CAL. CORP. CoDE§ 325(b)
(West 1988). Arkansas recognizes that loans to employees may promote good employer-employee
relationships, but nevertheless declines to authorize loans to employees who are officers, directors
or 10% shareholders. ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 4-26-204(b)(3) (1987) (applicable to corporations formed
before Dec. 31, 1987).
153. The states using the Delaware fon~at present a somewhat different problem. By
casting the loan enabling statues in terms of the borrowing needs of corporate "employees," these
states have left ambiguous the borrowing rights of, and the standard of care applicable to,loans to
outside directors.
154. See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text.
155. Outside directors may have other·perquisites available to them, including annual
retainers, substantial per-meeting fees; retirement plans based upon age or years of service as a
director; life insurance; "consulting" agreements and deferred compensation plans. Muckley,
supra note 128, at 46; Barnard, supra note 45, at 376-77. See generallY. HEWITT ASSOCIATES, HIGHLIGHTS OF COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR OUTSIDE DIRECTORS IN THE FORTUNE I00 INDUSTRIALS
(SEPT. 1987).
156. See supra note 36.
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B. Differential Treatment of Public, Non-Public and Close
Corporations

Currently, only one state acknowledges that the rules governing
the making of executive loans might appropriately differ as between
closely held and publicly held corporations. 157 However, the available
evidence suggests that executive lending behavior differs greatly depending on the shareholder makeup of the lending corporation, 158
warranting differential treatment in the enabling statutes.
For example, one might argue that it is unlikely that opportunistic
executive borrowing will occur in corporations which are truly publicly
held, for three reasons-the presence of a monitoring board which includes outside directors, the inhibiting influence of federal mandatory
disclosure requirements applicable to most such companies and the
presence of a sufficient body of subordinate employees who themselves
may act as a monitoring force against abuse. 159 If this is so, then it
would not be unreasonable for states to permit, as does California, corporations with one hundred or more shareholders to opt out of provisions requiring shareholder approval of executive loans, as long as the
board of directors remains bound by a meaningful benefit standard. 160
At the other end of the spectrum, corporations which are truly
closely held are likely to be the situs of frequent opportunistic borrowing, 161 but here, it is difficult to discern any appropriate state concern.
If Mom and Pop want to allocate $10,000 of the corporate resources of
Mom & Pop, Inc. as a loan to buy themselves a personal automobile or
a vacation in the south of France, no one, save the IRS and creditors,
each of whom already has an incentive to monitor and available mechanisms for redress, 162 should be concerned. The statutory "benefit" requirement in these situations seems both superfluous and unduly inva157. CAL. CORP. CoDE§ 315(b) (West 1987) (requires shareholder approval of executive
loans except where there are 100 or more shareholders of record and an authorizing by-law approved by the shareholders or an employee benefit plan which includes officers, in which case the
law permits director approval of loans made to officers upon a showing of corporate benefit).
158. See, e.g., Barnard, supra note 45, at 381, Fig. I (43.2% of"pre-public" corporations
found to have made material executive loans while only 16.7% of public corporations found to
have done so).
159. See Fischel, The "Race to the Bottom" Revisited: Reflections on Recent Developments
in Delaware's Corporation Law, 76 Nw. U.L. REV. 913, 919 (1982).
160. CAL. CORP. CoDE§ 315(b) (West 1987). There is, however, evidence that marketbased controls are ineffective in deterring opportunistic behavior, even in the largest corporations.
See supra note 54; Barnard, supra note 45, at 397-402; SEC v. Allegheny lnt'l, Inc., Litigation
Release No. 11,533, (Sept. 9, 1987); Allegheny International Sued by SEC. Wall St. J., Sept. 10,
1987, at I0, col. I. An opt-out provision would particularly disadvantage minority shareholders in
subsidiary corporations and other corporations subject to substantial control by a dominant
shareholder or group of shareholders.
161. See supra notes 52, 53 and accompanying text.
162. See supra notes 48, 50 and accompanying text.

HeinOnline -- 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 272 1988

1988:237

Corporate Loans to Directors and Officers

273

sive of a form of enterprise which is more realistically governed by tax
considerations than by state corporate law strictures. It would seem
reasonable, therefore, to permit corporations with five or less shareholders with unanimous approval to opt out of the benefit requirement.
It is the corporation in the middle of this spectrum which is most
likely to engage in executive loan-making behavior requiring state intervention. This category includes those companies not big enough to
rely on disclosure disincentives or market-based monitoring forces, but
big enough to have a substantial body of non-management shareholders essentially uninformed about management conduct and disproportionately disadvantaged by the existence of management self-dealing. 163 It is to these corporations especially that state regulation of
executive lending should be addressed.
C. The "Subterfuge" Issue

No state statute addresses the subterfuge issue which troubled Professor Jennings, 164 purporting only to regulate loans made to officers
and/or directors personally, but not those made to their family members or entities controlled by them. Thus, while states may limit the
making ofloans to corporate directors; they do not limit loans to directors' spouses, or offspring, or partnerships in which they are general
partners or even corporations of which they are sole shareholders. Presumably, those transactions are governed by other statutory conflict of
interest provisions, 165 but the executive loan enabling statutes would
better fulfill their intended purpose if, as some non-loan conflict of interest provisions do, 166 they expressly included within their purview at
least the immediate family members of officers and directors.
D. The Needfor Disclosure

As noted at the outset, statutory limitations on executive lending
were initially thought to serve the dual purposes of protecting shareholders and protecting creditors. 167 It is arguable that today the latter
purpose is adequately served by contractual arrangement and existing
creditors' remedies, so that only the former purpose continues to re163. Dean Knauss has argued that "(i)t is for this group of companies ...-those that are
not close corporations but that do not have publicly traded securities-that the procedural and
organizational state corporations laws are most needed." Knauss, The Problems of Smaller Public
. Corporations, in COMMENTARIES ON CORPORATE STRUCTURE AND GOVERNANCE 141, 144 (D.
Schwartz ed. 1979).
164. See supra note 2.
165. See supra note 120 and accompanying text.
166.
167.

See CONN. GEN. STAT.§ 33-323 (1959).
See supra note 4.
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quire state attention. One might thus urge that, in addition to imposing
a benefit standard on the directors, state law ought to require mandatory disclosure to shareholders of such executive loans as are approved
pursuant to that standard. Indeed, in the absence of disclosure any procedural limitation on executive loans may be meaningless.
Disclosure of this sort of information is not costly to make. 168 It
would be a natural addition to existing shareholder informational entitlements. It would provide a specific· means of enforcing the benefit
standard where market forces have failed.

V.

CONCLUSION

It has been twenty years since the Delaware legislature, racing to
the bottom in classic form, 169 led the way in encouraging directors to
make executive loans virtually unconstrained. Even though executive
lending was known then and for decades had been known to be an "extremely dangerous practice," 170 this managerial perquisite proved irresistible. State after state has jumped on the train with enabling legislation and, for lack of an effective policing mechanism, such
inappropriate loans as resulted have for the most part escaped sanction.
This Article does not suggest a return to the days when all executive loans were prohibited, but rather suggests that the current statutory approach to executive loans has resulted in several undesirable
consequences. This approach permits the diversion of corporate resources to nonproductive or at least non-optimizing uses; it encourages
the overcompensation of certain executives; it creates a license for managers to use their businesses as private lending sources at will, without
disclosure to shareholders, a practice which can lead to other failures of
financial control; it permits resort to the business judgment rule as a
defense to misappropriation. ·
A cautious regulatory approach to problems such as these might
encompass the following conditions:
No loan shall be made by a corporation to any officer,
director, shareholder ot employee of the corporation or any
member of such person's immediate family, or to any entity
controlled by that person, except:
A. Advances made for reimbursable expenses incurred
in carrying on the business of the corporation.
B. Loans made pursuant to a plan, previously approved by a majority of the shareholders, to facilitate employ168.
169.
170.

Barnard, supra note 45, at 402-09.
Cf Cary, supra note 3, at 666.
Marsh, supra note 29, at 68.
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ees relocated by the corporation in purchasing a principal
place of residence. Such plans shall specify a maximum percentage of the purchase price of the property. to be acquired
which will be loaned (not to exceed 80%) and shall require:
(1) that the corporation receive a first loan lien on the.
property acquired in the amount of the loan plus accumulated
interest;
(2) that the loan bear interest at a ra~e to be dete.rmined at
the time of each loan which is reasonably related to then applicable market interest for comparable loans.
C. Loans made pursuant to a plan, previously approved by a majority of the shareholders, to facilitate the purchase of shares in the corporation. Such plan shall specify a
maximum percentage of the fair market value of the shares to
be acquired which will be loaned (n.ot to.exceed _%)and
shall require:
(1) that the corporation shall retain the certificates until
the loan is repaid with interest in full.
(2) that the loan bear interest at a rate to be determined at
the time of each loan which is reasonably related to then applicable market interestfor comparable loans.
D. Loans which will otherwise benefit the corporation.
No loan shall be made pursuant to this paragraph unless:
(1) It has been approved by a majority of the board of
directors, excluding any director who is the recipient of or has
a pecuniary interest in the recipient of any portion of the loan
funds;
(2) The resolution proposing the loan shall reveal:
(a) The person or entity to whom the loan is to be made
and, if an entity, the names of all officers, directors, employees
or shareholders of the corporation having an interest in the
entity;
.
(b) The purpose of the loan, including a specific statement as to the use of the loan proceeds; ·
(c) A statement explaining the benefit to the corporation
which is expected to result from the loan. The mere receipt of
a market rate of interest on the loan is not benefit for purposes
of this subparagraph;
(3) The loan bears a rate of interest which is at least equal
to the lowest rate of interest at which the corporation borrowed money in the preceding twelve months, or current market interest rates, whichever is higher.
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(4) The loan is secured by property having a readily ascertainable or appraised value of at least 120% of the loan, or
is personally guaranteed by a person having a net worth of at
least four times the amount of the loan as reasonably represented in a personal financial statement reviewed by the board
of directors.
E. Any loan made pursuant to paragraphs B, C or D of
this section shall be disclosed to the shareholders in the next
annual report to shareholders following approval of the loan.
In the case of loans made pursuant to paragraph B or C, such
disclosure shall include the terms of the loan, including provisions for security, rate of interest and term of the loan. In the
case of loans made pursuant to paragraph D, disclosure shall
include the above information plus the text in full of any authorizing resolution passed by the board.
F. Any corporation with five or less shareholders may,
upon unanimous vote of the shareholders, waive the requirements of this section, on an annual basis.
G. For purposes of this section, "immediate family"
shall include a person's spouse, parents, children, siblings,
mothers- and fathers-in-law, sons- and daughters-in-law and
brothers- and sisters-in-law.
H. For purposes of this section, "entity controlled by a
person" shall include any entity in which that person owns,
controls or has the power to vote 25% or more of any class of
voting securities; controls in any manner the election of a majority of the directors; or of which that person is an officer,
director or general partner.

Even if the foregoing is deemed too constraining for a chartering
state to impose, it provides sound guidance for a corporation entertaining any thought of making executive loans.
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ALABAMA
Ala. Code§ I0-2A-69
ALASKA
Alaska Stat.
§§ 10.05.213, .216(d)
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Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann.
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DELAWARE
Del. Code Ann. tit. 8.
§ 143
DIST. OF COLUMBIA
D.C. Code Ann. §§ 29304(6), 342(a)(4)
X
FLORIDA
Fla. Stat. Ann.
§607.141
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Ga. Code Ann. §§ 14-221(b)(7), 14-5-5
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Haw. Rev. Stat.§ 41626(7)
IDAHO
Idaho Code§ 30-1-47
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Ind. Code Ann. § 23-135-3
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Iowa Code Ann.
§ 496A.4.6
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KANSAS
Kan. Stat. Ann. § 176303
KENTUCKY
Ky. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 271A.235
LOUISIANA
La. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 12.41
MAINE
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit.
13-A. § 202(1)(m)
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Md. Corps. & Ass"ns
Code Ann. § 2-416
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Mass. Gen. L. ch. 1568.
§ 62
MICHIGAN
Mich. Comp. Laws
Ann. §§ 450.1548.
1551(1)(d)
MINNESOTA
Minn. Stat. Ann.
§ 302A .501. 505

Requires
shareholder.
approval of
loans to
directors

Requires
shareholder
approval of
loans to
otlicers

Permits
board
approval of
loans to
Permits
directors
board
approval of wbo are
loans to any also
director
employees

\0

00
00

Permits
board
approval of
loans to
otlicers

Requires a
finding of
"benefit"
where board
approval is
permiUed

Imposes
liability on
directors for
any unpaid
portion of
No
the loan
Restriction

N

w

-....)

Other
("')
0

X

X

~

-·
0
....

X

1::)
~

X

X

X

t'-o

X

0

1::)

::s

x9

too

0

t:l

~
!")

X

0

X

X

~

X

1::)

::s

~

(X)

~

x•o

(X)

!")
~

~

X"

X''

X

X

X

X

X

X

x6
X'2

N

-....)

\0

Prohibits
loans to
officers &
dire(:tors

HeinOnline -- 1988 Wis. L. Rev. 280 1988

MISSISSIPPI
Miss. Code Ann. § 79-43.02(11)
MISSOURI
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NORTH CAROLINA
N.C. Gen. Stat§§ 55-22,
55-32(f)D
NORTH DAKOTA
N.D. Cent. Code§§ 1019.1-89.90
OHIO
Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 1701.95
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TENNESSEE
. Tenn. Code Ann. § 4818-303
TEXAS
Texas Bus. Corp. Act
Ann. art. 2.02A(6)
UTAH
Utah Code Ann.§§ 16- ·
10-43,44
VERMONT
Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. I I,
§ 1852(6)
VIRGINIA
Va. Code Ann.§ 13.1627.10
WASHINGTON
Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 23A.08.445, 450(2)
WEST VIRGINIA
W. Va. Code§ 31-1-101
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Wis. Stat. Ann.
§ 180.40(1)(d)
WYOMING
Wyo. Stat.§ 17-1-140.1
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Loans may be made to directors if either the specific loan or a general plan authorizing loans is approved by the board.
4
.If the loan is secured by shares of the corporation.
s If the corporation has I 00 or more shareholders and a bylaw approved by the shareholders authorizing board approval, loans to officers (even if directors) may be
approved by disinterested members of the board upon a showing of corporate benefit.
6
Where the loan is made contrary to provisions of the statute.
7
Requires a % vote of the shareholders, unless the articles of incorporation dictate otherwise.
8
Unless the articles specify otherwise.
9
Permits loans to employees to facilitate share purchases.
10
Unless a majority of disinterested directors have approved the loan, making a finding of corporate benefit.
11
Requires a % vote of the shareholders.
12
Permits advances for expenses.
13
Prohibits loans to facilitate share purchases, but otherwise permits loans secured by real or personal property.
14
Loans may be made to directors only if permitted in the certificate of incorporation or bylaws approved by the shareholders, or pursuant to a shareholder-approved
plan.
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Unless directors can demonstrate the loan was made for "a proper business purpose."
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APPENDIX II
State of
Incorporation

Company

Loan to

DE

Air Express International
Corp.

Senior V-P

AK

*Alaska National Bank of
the North
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FL
MD

IN
MD

UT

*Ambassador Financial
Group, Inc.
Americana Hotels and
Realty Corp.

*Ameriana Savings Bank.
F.S.B.
A val on Corp.

Beehive International

Higbest Amount
Outstanding
in 1986

Rate of Interest

Purpose

98,075

N/D

Directors & officers
collectively
A director
A director·

7,374,553

N/D

To permit borrower (a
foreign national) to
purchase stock in foreign
subsidiaries as required by
foreign law. 1
N/D

3,284,271
1,165,989

Base rate plus 2-3%
Base rate plus I%%

Direetors & executive
officers collectively
Directors & officers
collectively

1,319,968

Lower than prevailing
interest rates
N/D

A trusi of which· the
company's chairman is
trustee and CEO
Directors & officers
. collectively
Senior V-P/COO,

Executive V-P/Director

$

108,000

9,000,000

.25% below prime

For real estate development.
For payment of a tax
liability.
To finance personal
residences.
Unpaid balance on loans
made in 1984 to permit
purchase of shares on "an
extended payment plan."
N/D

z
-z
~

Cll
(j

0

Cll

369,415

N/D

150,000

Prime+%%

25,000

N/D

Mortgage and consumer
loans .
Loan to facilitate purchase
of personal residence (in
connection with borrower's
relocation).
In connection with
relocation to Salt Lake
City. 2

r

~

~

m

<

m
~
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Highest Amount
State of
Incorporation

Compsny

Loan to
Chairman of Board

DE

Bridge Communications,
Inc.
Carolco Pictures. Inc.

CA

The Clothestime, Inc.

CA

Co-Chairmen of Board
Vice-President

Key employee
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ID

Coeur D'Alene Mines Corp.

DE

Cytogen Corp.

CA 6

Datacopy·Corp.

President/CEO
Former key employee
Chairman
President/CEO
President/CEO

OutstaJJdiDg
inl986

s

\58,715
2.500.000
(each)
85,008
24 i ,000
870,000
190,008
95,425
101,653
198,000

\,C)

Rate or Interest

Purpose

10%

To purchase· stock.

\0.5%

Per'sonal loans. 3

10%
10%
\0%
10%
Prime+%%
Prime+%%
10% (later reduced to
6.81%)
N/D
9%
9%

To exercise opti~ns.
To exercise options·.
To exercise options.
To exercise options.
N/D4
N/D
To purchase stock. s

FL
DE

Devcon International Corp.
DiGiorgio Corp ..

Chairman
Chairman/CEO
Vice-President

224.000
182,721
59,915

No interest
12%
13%

NY

The Dreyfus Corp.

Officers collectively
Officers collectively
Vice-President & other
officers
Officer
Officers

529,868
334,156
59.469

No interest
9%
13.65%

13.978
169.058

10.33%
9.15%

To exercise stock options.
To exercise stock options.

CA

Dest Corp.
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200,215
135,990
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This was a cash payment to
7 officers "to offset. interest
due to company under ·loans
made by the company.... ·•
N/D
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To purchase property from
the eompany.
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To exercise stock options.
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Company

Loan to

OH

The Dreyfus Corp. (cont.)
Fabri-Centers of America,
Inc.

Officers
Executive officers

NC

First Provident Group, Inc.

CA

Flurocarbon Co.

Partnership in which the
issuer's CEO and V-P are
general partners
CEO/V-P
Key employees collectively

DE

Gemcraft Co.

NY

General Host Corp.

co

Gerber Energy
International, Inc.
Grandview Resources, Inc.

B.C. Canada

Chairman
Executive V-P
Director
"Principal stockholders"
and various ventures in
which they are principals
Joint venture in which a
director of the company is a
participant
Key employee
Officer/Director
A corporation controlled by
the Company's President

Highest Amount
Outstanding
in 1986
$

N

00

0'\

Rate of Interest

Purpose

277,330
194,333
298,172

5%
No interest
No interest

200,000

NfD

To exercise stock options.
"Long-term advances"
toward purchase of life
insurance policies, repayable
out of death benefits.
To fund operating deficits.

34,200
333,111

No interest
No interest

35,000
34,000
36,000

N/D

N/D
To assist in the purchases of
new residences, pursuant to
an Employee Relocation
Assistance Plan, approved
by the shareholders in 1981.
For partial payment for
purchase of excess inventory
of completed but unsold
houses. 8
N/D

527,000

No interest

402,000

12%

For acquisition of tract of
land.

249,884

4%-6%

200,000
100,000
137,228

12%
9.5%
No interest

To purchase shares of the
company's stock.
N/D
N/D
To purchase furniture and
office equipment.
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NY
CA

Company
*Heritage Financial Services.
Inc.
Highland Superstores. Inc.
Horn & Hardart Company

Jamesway Corp.
• John Adams Life Corp.

Loan to
Directors & their associates
& families
Vice-President
Executive V-P
Vice-Chairman

SeniorV-P
Officers & directors

Highest Amount
Outstanding
in 1986

00
00

N

Rate of Interest

Purpose

$ 7,968.000

N/D

N(D

99.095
125,000
154,700

N(D

To purchase a home. 9
"Personal Joan."
In connection with his
investment in a real estate
venture which was formed
to purchase a hotel-casino
from the company.
N/D
N/P
N/D (loans against
insurance policies issued by
the company).
To purchase stock.
To exercise non-qualified
option. 10
To exercise stock options.
"In connection with the
payment of certain income
tax withholding obligations
relating to the exercise of
stock options."
''Advances."
To exercise stock options.
In connection with the
payment of certain income
tax withholding obligations.

10%
10%

17.042
57,470
2.811,433

No interest
11.5%
N/D

No interest

DE
MA

The Liposome Co.
Mars Stores. Inc.

Chairman/CEO
. Chairman/CEO

3.948
420,000

N/D

DE

Michaels Stores. Ine.

CEO

236,250
34,688

6.7%
6.4%

Senior V-P

36,000
472.000
69.375

No interest
6.7%
6.4%
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N

00
-.I

State of
Incorporation

Company

VT

Nature's Sunshine Products,
Inc.

NY
DE

Novo Corp.
NPS Technologies Group,
Inc.
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CA

Occupational-Urgent Care
Health Systems, Inc.

ME

PEC Israel Economic Corp.

TX

Pratt Hotel Corp.

Loan to
President
· v-P
All executive officers
as a group

President
President & CEO

A medical corporation of
which the company's
chairman is CEO
Bank holding company of
which 2 of the company's
directors are also directors
Partnership in which the
company's chairman &
CEO. vice-chairman & ·
executive V-P are principals

Highest Amount
Outstanding
in 1986
$

N
00
00

Rate of Interest

Purpose

150,003
62,521
379,147

10%
10%
10%

96,000
335,200

5.5%
NfD

508,290

N/D

182,300

N/D

In consideration for the
officers' agreement with the
Company rescinding
previous agreements
_providing for income tax
indemnification.
For personal obligations.
Extension ofcredit for
construction of the
borrower's private residence.
Salary advances for amounts
"needed in conjunction with
certain personal investment
requirements.''''
To cover costs which were
in excess of the medical
corporation's income.

974.338

LIBR

+ %%

N/D

~
.....

CZl

()

518,000

N/D

President

450,000

9%

President

150,000

No interest

To cover operating deficits
and capital improvement·
costs of a hotel-in
connection with the
company's sale of the hotel.
For construction of
borrower's personal
residence.
NfD

0

z
z

CZl
.....

r

~
:;:tl

tr1

<
.....
tr1

~

State of
Incorporation

Company

Loan to

DE

Pubco Corp.

V-P

DE

Resorts International. Inc.

Executive V-P
Estate of chairman of the
board

CA
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DE
Republic of
Panama

Ross Stores, Inc.

*Security Pacific Corp.
Service Resources Corp.

Executive V-P

Directors & officers
Executive officers
President of subsidiary

Highest Amount
Outstanding
in 1986
$

Shoney's South. Inc.

UT

Tel Electronics, Inc.

DE

Tele-Communications, Inc.

Corporation of which the
company's CEO is director
(and whose son is the
principal owner)
President & CEO

(Company with interlocking
directorships)

1.0

Rate of Interest

Purpose

261,000

No interest

600,000
150,431

10%
No interest

Bridge loan to enable
borrower to complete
acquisition of a Chicago
residence prior to the sale of
his Cleveland residence.
To exercise stock option.
To defray certain personal
expenses until other funds
become available to the
estate.
To assist in purchase of a
home upon relocation to
California.
N/D
To exercise stock options.
N/D

200,000

N/D
I ,097,887
28;821
99,500

TN

-

00
00

300,000

No interest

N/D
10%-8%
12%
No interest

"Floating with prime"

39,302

10%

11,167
32,312,048

N/D
7Y.z%

For relocation expenses in
connection with his
promotion and transfer.
Purchase money mortgage
for sale of name, concept
and right to operate certain
restaurants.
Purchase money mortgage
in connection with sale of
property.
"Expense advances."
N/D

N
VJ
-.J

()
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1.0

State o(
Incorporation

Company

Loan to
Executive officer

DE

Tele-Communications. Inc.
(cont.)
Texas International Co.

PA
NJ
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UT

Transducer Systems,.lnc.
•The Trustcompany
Bancorporation
Tseng Labs. Inc.

DE

United Artists
Communications, Inc.

CA

Velobind, Inc.

DE
NJ

*
1

2

Xplor Corp.
Zenith Laboratories. Inc.

Highest Amount
Outstanding
inl986
$

140.000

IV
\0
0

Rate of Interest

Purpose

10%

Relocation to Colorado.

12% (later adjusted
downward)
N/D

To purchase home in
Oklahoma City.
To purchase home in
Oklahoma City.
To enable the borrower to
meet personal obligations. 12
N/D

Executive V-P

63,134

No interest

Director·

7S,OOO

10%

141,000

President/CEO
Officers .& directors

N/D

10% subsidiary also having
interlocking directors
President/CEO

234,000

N/D

"Advances."

260.000

10%

President/CEO

240,000
7S,S76

9%
9%

In connection with
borrower's purchase of a
residence in New York upon
his relocation from Texas.
To purchase stock.
To assist borrower in
purchasing stock and in
acquiring an automobile.
To purchase stock .
"Interest free equity
advances."

President
Senior V-P

$

N/D
180,000

N/D
No interest

Designates a corpordtion engaged in lending as its primary business.
The Company holds the purchased stock as collateral in connection with the fmancing and treats the loaned funds as investments in the foreign subsidiaries. Since
"the transactions were carried out to benefit the Company, interest is not assessed for these loans, and the full balance remains outstanding at this time." Proxy
Statement, at 9 (May IS, 1987).
"This loan will be forgiven by Beehive in 24 equal monthly installments, commencing with the month in which such loan is made. If [the borrower] voluntarily
terminates his employment with Beehive prior to the expiration of such 24 month period, he will be required to repay the portion of the loan which has not been
forgiven within 30 days of the effective date of his resignation." Proxy Statement, at IS (Feb. 13, 1987).
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These loans were two of a series which had been granted to the borrowers in recent years. "As of December 31, 1986, the total amount due on all of the above notes
was $11.892,000 and interest in the amount of$926,000 had accrued on the notes, of which $678,000 had been paid prior to year end . . .. The Company does not
currently intend to make any further loans." Proxy Statement, at 6 (May 22, 1987).
" These amounts reflect the amounts outstanding during 1986 of loans made in .1982·, pursuant to a company policy permitting the making of executive loans up to
$150.000. The company's board of directors terminated that policy effective March 31, 1987. Proxy Statement, at 7 (May 15, 1987).
5
The loan principal at year end was reduced by $50,000 "in recognition of outstanding services rendered to the Company" by the borrower. In early 1987, the
company forgave an additional $50,000, and reduced the applicable interest rate ..Proxy Statement, at 14 (May 7, 1987).
6
At its June 2, 1987, meeting, Datacopy shareholders approved a change in the company's state of incorporation from California to Delaware.
7
This loan was initially made in 1983, and later amended several times to alter the repayment terms and defer payment of interest. Proxy Statement, at 28-29 (Apr. 30,
1987).
8
These loans were made in 1982 and 1983. The company in October 1986 offered to forgive accrued interest and discount the outstanding principal on the notes
payable by 20%. if the balance was repaid by December 1986. Proxy Statement, at-.14 (May 26, 1987).
9
$65.472 of this amount was repaid and the remainder was forgiven by the company. Proxy Statement, at 4 (May I I, 1987).
10
The company will make a bonus payment to the borrower equivalent to . the interest due on this loan . The company will make any additional loans necessary to cover
the borrower's tax liability as a result of his exercise of the stock options, and forgive the amount due over a three-year period. Proxy Statement, at 14 (May 8, 1987).
11
"No plan has been established for the repayment of these funds, although [the borrower) has agreed to repay such advances upon demand." Proxy Statement, at 10
(May 16, 1987).
.
12
"[The· borrower) is in default on the loan to the Company for the principal installment due November 30, 1986, and for interest on the above indebtedness in the
amount of approximately $18,000 as of March 31, 1987. The Company is considering various courses of action with respect to the amount of the indebtedness in
default, including requiring [him) to sell shares of the Company's Common Stock owned by him, withholding amounts from his salary and bonus, and renegotiating
the terms of the loan . ... " Proxy Statement, at 6 (May II, 1987).
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